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Introduction 
Since the seminal works of institutional economics literature (Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962; North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981, 1990), the importance of 
institutions and government policies for economic performance has been well-
known. Indeed, political institutions aggregate citizen and group preferences into 
specific political outcomes, which in turn affect economic outcomes (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2005).  
The relationship between institutions and development has been investigated 
by several authors. Among them, Acemoglu et al. (2001) suggest that institutions 
adopted by European settlers in the colonies between the seventeenth and the 
nineteenth centuries have persisted to the present and have an effect on income per 
capita. Consequently, there are “substantial economic gains from improving 
institutions” (Acemoglu et al., 2001: 1395).  
Acknowledging the crucial role of institutions for economic development, 
this thesis comprises three essays that analyse the impact of internal and external 
factors on institutions, and how the latter influence development outcomes. 
The first essay considers how political regimes are affected by civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and democracy assistance. According to the academic 
literature, the economic effects of different types of regime are ambiguous: on the 
one hand, an expansion of political rights may promote economic rights and thereby 
stimulate growth; on the other, it may be detrimental to growth due to the activity 
of interest groups. Despite these contrasting results, democracy promotion has 
become a crucial goal because it is considered a means to achieve international 
peace and security, as well as economic and social progress and development. 
A wealth of studies has analysed which factors increase the probability of the 
emergence and consolidation of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi, 
1997; Rustow, 1970; Barro, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Among them, 
civil society seems to be crucial: when citizens are not well organized, the transition 
to democracy could be delayed indefinitely, whereas when civil society is 
developed, repression is more difficult and democracy may be preserved. 
The effect of aid on institutions and political reforms is hotly disputed 
(Crawford, 1997; Knack, 2001, 2004; Goldsmith, 2001; Heckelman, 2010). Aid 
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may stimulate democracy by promoting economic and social development or by 
funding institutional reforms. However, it can also have a harmful effect since it 
provides an alternative to tax collection that makes recipient governments less 
accountable to their citizens (rentier effect). 
The first essay contributes to the literature on civil society and democracy aid 
investigating whether projects implemented by CSOs improve the democracy level 
of recipient countries. In particular, it evaluates the effectiveness of projects funded 
by the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), a trust fund established in 2005 
by the United Nations.  
An empirical analysis based on the propensity score matching method is 
carried out for a sample of developing countries. The treatment group includes 
countries that benefited from projects implemented by CSOs and funded by 
UNDEF between 2006 and 2011. The findings indicate that the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) is positive and significant only when UNDEF-funded 
projects are repeated over time. This suggests that UNDEF should continue to fund 
civil society and local non-governmental organizations, but it should also 
implement long-term planning in order to ensure continuity of the intervention. 
Aid has often been compared to natural resources in terms of its possible 
“rentier effect”. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that countries highly endowed 
in exploitable natural resources perform worse than those lacking this asset (Sachs 
and Warner, 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Gylfason, 2001; Ross, 2001; Caselli 
and Michaels, 2013). However, the detrimental effect of natural resources is not 
homogeneous across countries (Robinson et al., 2006).  
The second essay evaluates the impact of resource endowment on institutions 
taking heterogeneity into account. Specifically, the synthetic control method is used 
to compare the evolution of the democracy level in countries in which giant oil 
reserves were discovered with the weighted democracy level of countries that do 
not undergo the same event and had similar pre-event characteristics.  
Focusing on 12 countries in which the rate of oil discoveries started to decline 
in the 1970s or later (peak of oil discoveries), the variation in oil endowment has a 
negative effect in the long run in most cases, but countries with a high level of 
democracy in the pre-event period were unaffected. 
11 
 
Arguing that the effect of natural resources on development outcomes may depend 
on the type of resources (Isham et al., 2005) and on the quality of the institutional 
environment (Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006), the third essay analyses 
how resource abundance affects fiscal capacity, defined as the amount of taxes that 
a government could potentially raise given the structure of the tax system and its 
powers of enforcement. This outcome is strategically important for economic 
development since the capacity to collect revenue is indispensable to public goods 
provision and investment in infrastructure (Besley and Persson 2011).  
Using panel methods, the essay tests two hypotheses: a) resource rents reduce 
the incentives to invest in fiscal capacity, thereby resource-rich countries have less 
developed tax systems and collect a lower share of income taxes in total taxes; b) 
political institutions placing limits on executive powers promote common interests 
and, thus, raise the incentives for investing in fiscal capacity. A high level of 
executive constraints may therefore mitigate or neutralise the negative effect of 
natural resources on fiscal infrastructures.  
Empirical analysis demonstrates that resource rents are negatively associated 
with fiscal capacity, measured as the share of non-resource taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains in total non-resource taxes. However, countries with a high level 
of executive constraints are able to neutralise or even reverse this effect, depending 
on the type of resource endowments. The paper also provides insight into the 
specific channels through which natural resources impact on tax systems, 
suggesting that they affect fiscal institutions that make the state accountable and 
transparent to its citizens. 
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1. Strengthening the voice of civil society: 
The impact of the United Nations Democracy Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Democracy assistance has become one of the main components of foreign aid programmes. 
Following this trend, in 2005, the United Nations established the UN Democracy Fund 
(UNDEF), whose objective is to support projects submitted by NGOs and civil society 
aimed at increasing government accountability. This paper investigates the impact of civil 
society organizations on democracy, utilizing the UNDEF database. Empirical analysis 
based on a propensity score matching method is carried out on a sample of 102 developing 
countries. In particular, a logistic model is used to match countries that benefited from 
projects implemented by NGOs and civil society, funded by UNDEF between 2006 and 
2011 (treated), with a well-selected control group. The findings indicate that the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is positive and significant only when countries 
implement UNDEF-funded projects for three rounds or more. In this case, for treated 
countries, the Polity IV indicator improves by an average of 1.28 points compared to the 
level in 2005.  
 
 
Keywords: Democracy, United Nations, civil society, propensity score analysis, impact 
evaluation. 
JEL Codes: C31, F53, L31, P48 
 
 
This essay has benefited from the comments of participants at the 15th Jan Tinbergen European Peace 
Science Conference, University of Warwick, and the 10th Annual Conference on the Political 
Economy of International Organizations (PEIO), University of Bern. An excerpt was published in 
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2015, 21(4), 489-496. 
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1.1 Introduction 
One of the most demanding tasks in development economics is to identify tools and 
policies that can foster growth and social progress, as well as international peace 
and security. Foreign aid from developed to developing countries has attracted 
interest as a potential way to accomplish these goals. The first development 
assistance programmes were targeted at promoting better economic performance by 
encouraging investments in agricultural reforms, infrastructure, education and 
health. Starting from the early 1990s, democracy promotion has become a crucial 
component of foreign aid. It aims to empower voters and supports political parties, 
labour unions and advocacy networks. 
Civil society has been acknowledged as essential for both democratisation 
and the maintenance of democracy. This explains why donor countries allocate  
most democracy aid through civil society organisations (CSOs). According to the 
World Bank CSOs include community groups, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations, and foundations.1 Among them, NGOs 
became the main actors during the   twentieth century. Indeed, the number of NGOs 
with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ESOCOC) rose from 40 in 1940 to over 3,900 in 2014. More than 38,000 
international NGOs are currently working worldwide (Year Book of International 
Organizations, 2014), and, in 2011, $19.3 billion of official development assistance 
(ODA) was allocated to and through civil society (OECD, 2013).  
Following this trend, the Member States of the United Nations (UN) have 
committed themselves to sparing no effort in promoting democracy, strengthening 
the rule of law, and protecting human rights (United Nations, 2000). As a 
consequence, in 2005, the UN established the United Nations Democracy Fund 
(UNDEF), whose objective is to support projects implemented by NGOs and civil 
society in the field of strengthening democratic dialogue, civil society 
empowerment, civic education, freedom of information, and the rule of law. 
This paper intends to contribute to the debate on aid and democratisation by 
utilizing the UNDEF project database to provide some empirical results on the 
                                                          
1 http://crinfo.worldbank.org/crinfo/social_responsibility/civil_society.html.  
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effects of CSO activity on democracy. While much of the literature relies on 
qualitative case studies, this research conducts a cross-country analysis to evaluate 
whether and to what extent UNDEF-funded projects are effective in improving the 
level of democracy of recipient countries. The hypothesis is that countries 
benefiting from UNDEF-funded CSO projects have higher democracy scores due 
to the positive effect on grassroots participation and government accountability. 
However, a threshold number of UNDEF funding rounds may be necessary to 
achieve the objective. 
As highlighted by Acemoglu in his Boston Review piece on effective altruism, 
“a precise measurement of the social value of a donated dollar may be impossible”.2 
However, the policy implications of such an evaluation are of great importance and 
an approach exists that can provide an assessment of the global effectiveness of 
CSO projects: the propensity score matching (PSM) method. Although generally 
used in microeconomic applications, PSM overcomes the selection bias problem as 
well as other specific issues that arise in a macroeconomic context (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2005). 
This paper implements PSM on a sample of 102 developing countries. 
Empirical analysis shows that benefiting from CSO projects for at least three rounds 
of UNDEF funding actually increases the level of democracy in recipient countries. 
In particular, for treated countries, UNDEF projects have higher Polity IV scores 
by 1.28 compared to 2005. However, the effect is not significant for countries in 
which CSO projects take place for only one or two rounds. This suggests that 
UNDEF projects should be repeated over time in order to be effective. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the role 
of civil society and foreign aid in democratisation and democratic transitions; 
Section 3 is dedicated to UNDEF; Section 4 introduces the identification strategy, 
and the data are described in Section 5; Section 6 presents the results, the robustness 
of which is checked in Section 7; Section 8 sums up. 
 
 
                                                          
2 http://bostonreview.net/forum/logic-effective-altruism/daron-acemoglu-response-effective-
altruism (1st July 2015)  
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1.2 Civil society, democratisation and democracy aid 
This paper refers to two strands in the literature. The first concerns the relationship 
between civil society, democratisation and democratic consolidation (Diamond, 
1994, 1997; Burnell and Calvert, 2004). As recognised by Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006), civil society is often considered “the hero of democratic resistance and 
transition” (Linz and Stepan, 1997: 18). However, few studies properly analyse the 
interaction between institutions and civil society and non-governmental 
organizations3. In fact, much of this strand of the literature has been produced by 
NGO activists or social scientists with close links to funding agencies. As a result, 
it is not clear whether and exactly how civil society organizations contribute to 
democratisation and to the formal political process (Edwards and Hulme, 1994; 
Clarke, 1998).  
Hirschman (1987) argues that it is impossible to prove a connection between 
the decline of the authoritarian state in Latin America and the rise of NGOs and 
grassroots social movements. Bratton (1989) maintains that African governments 
have responded ambiguously to the appearance of NGOs. On the one hand, they 
have valued the economic resources that NGOs can provide. On the other, they have 
resisted the political pluralisation involved in popular development actions. Thus, 
in the ‘80s, African governments were neither as democratically responsive as their 
South Asian counterparts, nor as effective at authoritarian control as Latin 
American military governments.  
Sanyal (1994) discusses the bottom-up development efforts led by NGOs. He 
claims that the political impact of bottom-up projects has been even less evident 
than their economic impact. The lack of political impact of these projects has two 
causes: a) implementation often requires the support of the local elite; b) the NGOs 
that implement the bottom-up projects usually lack institutional linkage with 
political parties and the government. Conversely, Clarke (1998) reports significant 
contributions of NGOs to democratisation and political change. In particular, they 
helped restore democracy in Chile in 1990, and in the Philippines in 1992.  
                                                          
3 See Mercer (2002) for a critical review of the literature on the relationship between NGOs, civil 
society and the state. 
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Rahman (2006) links the erosion of democratic institutions to the de-
politicisation of NGOs. Examining the case of Bangladesh, the author claims that 
the NGO sector has shifted away from its initial focus on promoting political 
mobilisation and empowerment, and has become a provider of goods. This change 
has led to a macro-level crisis in democratic institutions and the public sphere in 
Bangladesh. 
The second strand of the literature to which this paper refers is the impact of 
foreign aid on democracy. Here too, academic research has come to a variety of 
conclusions. Crawford (1997) and Knack (2004) show that there is no evidence that 
aid promotes political reform or democracy, whereas aid dependence can actually 
erode the quality of government (Knack, 2001). On the contrary, Goldsmith (2001) 
finds a positive relationship between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
the level of democracy in Africa, and Heckelman (2010) concludes that aid has been 
beneficial to democratic reforms in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union. 
Finkel et al. (2007) claim that researchers should not lump together 
democracy assistance with programmes designed to improve health, education, the 
environment, or economic growth.4 Based on this distinction, the authors analyse 
the effect of the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) on the level 
of democracy in 165 countries between 1990 and 2003. Their findings show that an 
investment of one million dollars fosters an increase in democracy which is 65 
percent more than the change expected for the average country in the sample, in 
any given year. Scott and Steele (2011) reach similar conclusions examining the 
impact of democracy aid from USAID on democratisation in Latin America, the 
Middle East, Africa and Asia between 1988 and 2001. Using a simultaneous 
equation model, they confirm the positive effect of democracy aid, while general 
foreign economic aid does not have a significant impact on democratisation. 
Finally, a few papers analyse the link between aid programmes and civil 
society organisations. Howell (2000) looks at donor attempts to strengthen civil 
                                                          
4 Democracy assistance is defined as “aid that is specifically designed to foster a democratic opening 
in a nondemocratic country or to further democratic transition in a country that has experienced a 
democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999: 6). 
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society from the outside. The author shows that donors have played a significant 
role in shaping civil society in many aid-recipient countries by supporting some 
organizations and excluding others. Specifically, after the cold war, donors focused 
on urban and formal organisations engaged with the state at the national level. This 
ignores the complex effects of class, ethnicity and gender in political processes. 
Examining the role assigned to civil society in South Africa, Hearn (2000) shows 
that donors have favoured CSOs concerned with promoting the values, procedures 
and overall framework of democracy, rather than advocacy NGOs, which tackle a 
single issue. After the election of 1994, these organizations have played a crucial 
role in connecting new government structures with South African society as a 
whole. However, given the focus of aid programmes on political stability rather 
than on socioeconomic transformation, they have failed to reduce inequality. Savun 
and Tirone (2011) claim that democracy aid not only helps democratic transitions, 
but also decreases the risk of conflict by increasing the accountability of incumbents 
and by empowering civil society organizations. In particular, CSOs limit state 
power and subject government actions to close public scrutiny. 
      
1.3 The United Nations Democracy Fund  
The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) was established by the UN 
Secretary-General in July 2005 as a UN General Trust Fund.5 The purpose of 
UNDEF is to support democratisation by funding projects that strengthen the voice 
of civil society, promote human rights, and encourage the participation of all in the 
democratic process. Projects are for two years and include the strengthening of 
democratic dialogue, civil society empowerment, civic education, freedom of 
information, and the rule of law.  
UNDEF is funded entirely by voluntary contributions from governments. 
Since 2005, it has received more than 150 million dollars from forty countries, 
including developing countries. Table 1.1 shows contributions. 
 
 
                                                          
5 See UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/1 (paragraphs 135-137, page 30). For a discussion 
of the definition of trust funds, see Macy (1972). 
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[Table 1.1 about here] 
 
Projects may be implemented by governments, national and 
intergovernmental bodies, regional units and UN entities. However, UNDEF 
favours projects implemented by civil society and non-governmental organizations. 
Indeed, of the 405 local projects carried out from 2006 to 2012, 365 were 
implemented by civil society and NGOs.6 These organizations completed 117 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, 93 in Asia and the Pacific, 55 in the Americas, and 
50 in both Europe and the Arab States.  
In most cases, no more than one project is carried out in a given country in 
any one year. Few countries are involved in two projects per year. Three projects 
took place in Iraq in 2006. UNDEF grants range from $50,000 to $500,000, and the 
average amount approved is over $260,000. Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix lists the 
amount and the number of projects by country and year. Table 1.2 provides some 
descriptive statistics. 
 
[Table 1.2 about here] 
 
UNDEF does not seek projects, but exerts some influence at the design stage. 
Since UNDEF acts as a project taker rather than a project maker, it cannot identify 
and address specific needs. Nevertheless, UNDEF projects do meet real needs 
thanks to its selection process (MacKellar et al., 2014). Generally, projects that 
focus on tightly defined target beneficiary groups tend to have higher scores for 
effectiveness and relevance. Grantees are selected by a rigorous and competitive 
process that includes quality control and due diligence.  
The UN Secretary-General-appointed Advisory Board evaluates funding 
proposals. It represents or includes: a) the seven largest Member State contributors, 
b) the Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Partnership (UNOP), c) 
six other Member States from different regions, d) three individual members, and 
                                                          
6 See the UNDEF project database available at http://www.un.org/democracyfund/searchform. 
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e) two representatives of civil organizations. The Advisory Board recommends 
funding proposals for approval by the Secretary-General.7 
All projects are assessed after completion. Transtec, the UNDEF-contracted 
commercial evaluator, has assessed most of them. Transtec ensures the independent 
and transparent assessment of UNDEF projects. It combines qualitative and 
quantitative approaches and provides statistical and numerical evidence of 
performance, as well as informed opinions and the experience of key partners, 
stakeholders and beneficiaries, providing a better understanding of the effects of 
the interventions and analysing the lessons learnt.8 However, no evaluation of the 
average effect of UNDEF projects on political institutions has been carried out. 
Although the amount approved for each project is not high, the selection 
process and the evaluation after completion guarantee the effectiveness of civil 
society and NGO activity. This means that countries benefiting from UNDEF-
funded CSO projects should show a higher level of grassroots participation and 
government accountability, which, in turn, should have a positive effect on the 
country’s democracy score. The following sections test this hypothesis.            
 
1.4 The identification strategy 
The identification of the impact of civil society and NGO projects on democracy 
runs into the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland, 1986: 947). This 
problem arises when, for a given unit exposed to a programme or treatment, the 
alternative state of affairs in the absence of the intervention is unobservable, and 
therefore the effect of treatment is unidentifiable. The Neyman-Rubin 
counterfactual framework of causality (Neyman, 1935; Rubin, 1974) overcomes 
this problem by evaluating the mean outcome of treatment participants and the 
mean outcome of non-treatment participants among the population.9 According to 
                                                          
7 For details on UNDEF governance, see the Terms of Reference available at 
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/terms-reference. 
8 See http://www.transtec.be 
9 Let 𝐸(𝑌ଵ| 𝑊 = 1) denote the mean outcome of the individuals who comprise the treatment group, 
and 𝐸(𝑌଴|𝑊 = 0) denote the mean outcome of the individuals who comprise the control group. The 
average treatment effect (ATE) is defined as 𝜏 = 𝐸(𝑌ଵ| 𝑊 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌଴| 𝑊 = 0).    
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this framework, the standard estimator of the treatment effect is consistent if the 
mean outcome for the treated group under the status of non-treatment is the same 
as the mean outcome of the control group, and the mean outcome for the latter under 
the status of treatment is the same as the mean outcome of the former.10  
This condition is met in randomized experiments, in which treatments are 
allocated randomly to experimental units (Fisher, 1935; Kempthorne, 1952; Cox, 
1958). By contrast, observational studies, including the empirical analysis 
undertaken in this paper, lack random assignment and are subject to selection bias. 
Indeed, CSOs choose to submit their project proposals (self-selection) and are 
selected by UNDEF (administrator selection). To solve this problem, Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) can be implemented (Rosenbaum, 2002; Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). The matching approach compares differences in outcomes between 
the treatment participants and a well-selected control group. This group comprises 
those individuals that do not participate in the intervention and are similar to the 
participants in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics X. PSM develops a single 
score that captures all the relevant characteristics, rather than requiring a one-to-
one match of each x. The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability 
of receiving treatment (𝑊 = 1) given a vector of observed characteristics 
(covariates 𝑿): 
 
𝑝(𝑿) = 𝑃(𝑊 = 1|𝑿) 
 
Conditional on the propensity score, potential outcomes are independent of 
treatment assignment, as in randomized experiments (the unconfoundedness 
assumption). If this assumption holds, and units with the same x values have a 
positive probability of being both participants and non-participants (overlap 
assumption), then the mean difference of the outcome variable between treated and 
control participants for all units with the same value of propensity score is an 
unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect (ATE): 
                                                          
10 𝐸(𝑌଴| 𝑊 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌଴| 𝑊 = 0) and 𝐸(𝑌ଵ| 𝑊 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌ଵ| 𝑊 = 1), where 𝐸(𝑌଴| 𝑊 = 1) and 
𝐸(𝑌ଵ| 𝑊 = 0) are potential outcomes. 
[1.1] 
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[1.5] 
 
𝜏 = 𝐸[𝐸(𝑌ଵ|𝑝(𝑿), 𝑊௜ = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌଴|𝑝(𝑿), 𝑊௜ = 0)] 
 
Focusing on the effects on those who actually participated in the treatment, it 
is possible to define the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as the 
difference between the expected outcome values with and without treatment for the 
participants:11 
 
𝜏஺்் = 𝐸௣(𝑿)|ௐୀଵ[𝐸(𝑌ଵ|𝑝(𝑿), 𝑊௜ = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌଴|𝑝(𝑿), 𝑊௜ = 0)] 
 
The propensity scores are estimated using logistic regression, i.e. the 
conditional probability of receiving the treatment is defined as follows:12 
 
𝑃(𝑊௜ = 1|𝑿௜) = 𝐸(𝑊௜) =
𝑒௫೔ఉ೔
1 + 𝑒௫೔ఉ೔
=
1
1 + 𝑒ି௫೔ఉ೔
 
 
The selected matching algorithm is kernel matching (KM). With respect to 
other algorithms, KM provides a lower variance of the estimator because more 
information is used.13 Indeed, this is a non-parametric matching estimator using the 
weighted averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. Weights are inversely proportional to the distance between 
propensity scores for treated participants and controls. The KM estimator of the 
ATT is given by: 
 
                                                          
11 Heckman (1997) claims that ATE is not policy relevant because interest should focus on the 
effects of programmes on intended recipients, and exclude persons for whom the programme was 
never intended. 
12 For details on the estimation of the propensity scores, see Guo and Fraser (2015). 
13 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) discuss the trade-offs in terms of bias and efficiency of the matching 
algorithms.  
[1.2] 
[1.3] 
[1.4] 
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𝜏஺்்௄ =
1
𝑁ௐୀଵ
 ෍ ൞𝑌௜(ௐୀଵ) −
∑ 𝑌௝(ௐୀ଴)𝐾 ൬
𝑝(𝑿)௝ − 𝑝(𝑿)௜
ℎ௡
൰௝∈(ௐୀ଴)
∑ 𝐾 ൬𝑝(𝑿)௞ − 𝑝(𝑿)௜ℎ௡
൰௞∈(ௐୀ଴)
ൢ
௜∈(ௐୀଵ)
 
 
where i is a treated unit, j is a control unit, 𝑌௜(ௐୀଵ) and 𝑌௝(ௐୀ଴) are the observed 
outcomes of the treated and control units respectively, 𝑁ௐୀଵ is the number of units 
in the treated group, ℎ௡ is a bandwidth parameter and K(·) is the kernel function. In 
this paper, the counterfactual outcome of 𝑌଴௜ is estimated using fixed bandwidth 
and the Epanechnikov kernel:14 
 
𝐾(𝑢) = ଷ
ସ
(1 − 𝑢ଶ)1{|௨|ஸଵ}. 
 
 
1.5 Data 
Coming to the data, the level of democracy of recipient countries is evaluated via 
the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2014), which provides a 21-point scale 
ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The 
Polity IV score is a composite indicator derived from the weighted average of the 
following components: a) competitiveness of political participation, b) regulation 
of participation, c) openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, d) 
constraints on the chief executive. 
The propensity score is estimated with a set of covariates related to both the 
level of democracy and the presence of CSOs in the countries, but unaffected by 
participation in the programme. Firstly, real GDP per capita is used to take into 
account the broadly acknowledged correlation between democracy and this 
measure of economic performance. Secondly, the amount of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is used as a proxy for the presence of the organizations in the 
                                                          
14 The estimator of the counterfactual outcome of 𝑌଴௜ is given by  
∑ ௒ೕ(ೈసబ)௄൬
೛(𝑿)ೕష೛(𝑿)೔
೓೙
൰ೕ∈(ೈసబ)
∑ ௄ቀ
೛(𝑿)ೖష೛(𝑿)೔
೓೙
ቁೖ∈(ೈసబ)
 . 
For details on the Epanechnikov kernel, see Epanechnikov (1969).    
[1.6] 
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country.15 Thirdly, the urban population as a percentage of total population is taken 
to be related to both democracy and CSO activity.16 The data for these three 
variables come from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) database.17 Finally, the Freedom House database is used to consider 
one of the main fields of UNDEF projects:  freedom of information.18 More 
precisely, Freedom House provides a score for press freedom on a 100-point scale. 
In this paper, the lower the numeric score, the lower the press freedom, and the 
opposite for the Freedom of the Press Index. Table 1.3 sets out the data description 
and sources.  
 
[Table 1.3 about here] 
 
Logistic regression uses the mean value of each covariate computed in the 
period from 2000 to 2005. This ensures that neither temporary shocks nor 
participation in the projects affects the probability of being in the treated group. 
Furthermore, to remove any bias from unobservable characteristics, the outcome 
variable (democracy) is given by the difference between the Polity scores in 2012 
and 2005. These data are available for a sample of 102 developing countries. Table 
1.4 provides summary statistics of the outcome variable and covariates. 
 
[Table 1.4 about here] 
 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 map the distribution of types of regime in 2005 and in 
2012 respectively. Polity scores are converted into regime categories as suggested 
by the Polity IV Project: autocracy from -10 to -6 of the Polity IV scale, closed 
                                                          
15 For details of the increasing role of NGOs in managing and delivering ODA, see OECD (2013). 
16 The literature shows mixed but significant results for the relationship between democracy and 
urbanization. Moreover, given their purpose, NGO projects approved by UNDEF are more likely to 
be developed in urban areas.   
17 The database is available at https://unctadstat.unctad.org./ 
18 The database is available at https://freedomhouse.org/ 
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anocracy19 from -5 to 0, open anocracy from 1 to +5, democracy from +6 to +9, and 
full democracy +10.  
 
[Figure 1.1 about here] 
 
[Figure 1.2 about here] 
 
Of the 102 countries in the sample, from 2006 to 2011, eighteen were not 
involved in UNDEF projects, 18 benefited for one round only, 22 for 2 rounds, 17 
for 3, 11 for 4, 12 for 5, and 4 countries for 6 rounds. The next section presents the 
empirical results considering in the treatment group, firstly countries in which CSO 
projects took place for at least a round, then countries benefiting for at least two 
rounds, and, finally, those involved for at least three rounds.  
 
1.6 Results 
Figures 1.3 to 1.5 map the distribution of treated and control countries placing in 
the treatment group all countries in which CSO projects took place for at least one 
round, two rounds, and three rounds respectively.  
 
[Figure 1.3 about here] 
 
[Figure 1.4 about here] 
 
[Figure 1.5 about here] 
 
When the treatment group includes countries that benefited for at least one or 
two rounds, four treated countries are discarded in the matching procedure since 
they are off support. Table 1.5 provides the estimate of the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT). In the first two specifications, the ATT is positive but not 
                                                          
19 Marshall and Cole (2014: 21) define anocracies as “countries whose governments are neither fully 
democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an often incoherent mix of democratic and 
autocratic traits and practices.”  
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significant. This means that, on average, CSO projects do not affect the level of 
democracy in recipient countries. 
 
[Table 1.5 about here] 
 
Considering at least three rounds, 44 countries belong to the treated group and 
58 to the control group.20 Figure 1.6 shows that the common support is wide and all 
the treated units are on support in this case. Thus, a correct causal inference can be 
made for the entire treated group.   
 
[Figure 1.6 about here] 
 
Figure 1.7 provides the boxplot of the estimated propensity scores grouped 
for treated and control countries, and confirms this inference. The treated boxplot 
shows that the median of the propensity score for this group is around 0.5, whereas 
the control group has a median below 0.4. Moreover, while the treated countries are 
distributed symmetrically, the distribution of control units is slightly right-skewed. 
Nevertheless, neither of the two groups includes any outlier. This condition and the 
existing overlap between the distributions of the two groups show how treated and 
control countries can be matched effectively. The boxplot of the estimated 
propensity score for the matched sample, given in Figure 1.8, proves that propensity 
score kernel matching does generate a control group similar enough to the treated 
group. In this figure, most observations of treatment and control groups have the 
same likelihood of benefiting from UNDEF projects. 
 
[Figure 1.7 about here] 
 
[Figure 1.8 about here] 
 
The covariate imbalance before and after matching confirms the 
comparability of the two groups. Indeed, Table 1.6 shows that the reduction in bias 
                                                          
20 They are listed in Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix. 
28 
 
is over 70% for all covariates except for the amount of ODA per capita, for which 
it is around 30%. Nevertheless, the p-value of the t-test suggests that the mean value 
of each variable is the same in the treated and control group. Figure 1.A.1 in the 
Appendix gives the boxplots of the covariate imbalance between treated and control 
countries for each variable. 
 
[Table 1.6 about here] 
 
Having verified the overlap assumption and assuming that the 
unconfoundedness assumption holds, the last row of Table 1.5 provides an unbiased 
estimate of the average treatment effect on countries benefiting from CSO projects 
for at least three UNDEF rounds. In this case, the ATT is positive and significant at 
the 0.05 level. This means that CSO projects taking place for at least three rounds 
of UNDEF funding increase the level of democracy in recipient countries. More 
precisely UNDEF projects have raised the Polity IV score by 1.28 compared to the 
level in 2005. 
 
1.7 Robustness checks 
The implementation of propensity score matching entails a number of decisions 
concerning the estimation of the propensity score, which may affect the results. This 
section assesses the sensitivity of the estimated ATT to different specifications of 
the PSM.  
The first choice refers to the estimation model. Table 1.7 presents the 
estimates of the ATT using a probit rather than logit model.  Continuing to impose 
the common support restriction, this model means that when the treatment group 
includes countries that benefited for at least one round, five treated countries are 
discarded since they are not on support. Four countries are off support considering 
at least two rounds. Nevertheless, the sign and significance of the parameters do not 
differ from the previous estimate. 
 
[Table 1.7 about here] 
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The second choice concerns the matching algorithm. Nearest neighbour (NN) 
matching is the most straightforward estimator. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) 
suggest using more than one NN. This allows variance to be reduced by using more 
information to construct the counterfactual, but it also increases the bias. Table 1.8 
shows the results obtained considering five, ten and twenty matching partners. In 
this case too, the effect of CSO projects is significant only when the treated group 
includes countries benefiting from at least three UNDEF-funding rounds. However, 
as the number of NNs increases, the ATT decreases. This confirms that projects 
should be repeated over time, but it also suggests that the effect of CSO projects 
may be even higher than the one presented in the previous section. 
 
[Table 1.8 about here] 
 
Implementing kernel matching, two decisions have to be made, the first about 
the kernel function and the second about the bandwidth parameter. The former is 
assessed using a normal and a tricube function instead of the Epanechnikov kernel. 
Table 1.9 shows that it does not affect the results; the ATT is  only slightly smaller 
considering the normal function.       
 
[Table 1.9 about here] 
 
The choice of the bandwidth parameter involves a trade-off between the bias 
and variance of the density function. On the one hand, the higher the bandwidth 
parameter the smoother the estimated density function, and therefore the smaller 
the variance between the estimated and the true underlying density function. On the 
other hand, a smaller parameter reduces the bias, but increases the variance. The 
estimates of the ATT presented in Table 1.5 are obtained using a fixed bandwidth 
parameter of 0.06, and Table 1.10 sets out the results of the matching procedure 
considering bandwidths of 0.04 and 0.08. These specifications confirm previous 
results in terms of the size of the ATT, but a bandwidth value of 0.04 leads to a 
significant effect, including for countries involved for at least two rounds. However, 
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in this case, the effect is significant at the 0.10 level, whereas the significance level 
remains 0.05 considering at least three rounds.  
 
[Table 1.10 about here] 
 
 
1.8 Conclusions 
This is the first paper that empirically tests the hypothesis that benefiting from CSO 
projects granted by UNDEF has a positive effect on the level of democracy in 
recipient countries. The UNDEF project database provides the conditions for 
evaluating the treatment effect and enables cross-country analysis to be carried out, 
rather than a qualitative case study.  
The analysis shows that, for countries benefiting from at least three rounds of 
UNDEF funding, CSO projects raised the Polity IV score by 1.28 compared to the 
level in 2005. In contrast, the effect is not significant for countries involved for 
fewer years. Robustness checks support these results and suggest that the effect may 
be even higher.  
The findings indicate that specific projects may be more effective for 
democratisation than large amounts of general economic aid (Scott and Steele, 
2011), and are consistent with Persson and Tabellini (2009) who claim that 
democracy emerges through the slow accumulation of civic and social assets. As a 
policy consequence, this suggests that UNDEF should continue to fund civil society 
and local NGOs, but should implement long-term planning and support projects 
over time. This may be particularly positive for African countries, most of which 
are anocracies with a chance to move towards democracy. Moreover, since the 
institutional effects unfold over time and are cumulative (Gerring et al., 2005), it 
could assist developing countries in reaching the path to economic growth.  
CSO projects may have a beneficial effect on the quality of the institutions in 
the recipient country through two mechanisms that are mutually reinforcing. On the 
one hand, ex-post evaluation indirectly affects not only the CSO involved in the 
project, but also the institutions benefiting from its activity. Consequently, the 
accountability of local governments increases. On the other hand, when interaction 
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between UNDEF governance and the recipient country is repeated over time, CSO 
projects are more likely to be effective. In either case, the plausible positive effect 
on grassroots participation and government accountability should spill over and 
affect the components of the Polity IV score. Further studies should investigate 
these mechanisms. 
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Table 1.1 - Status of contributions by cumulative amount as at 8 May 2014 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Cumulative 
Amount 
 (US dollars) 
1 USA 10,000,000 7,920,000  7,920,000 3,000,000 4,500,000 5,000,000 4,755,000 4,581,000  47,676,000 
2 India 5,000,000 5,000,000  5,000,000 5,000,000  5,000,000 4,710,000 1,852,543  31,562,543 
3 Sweden  729,450 755,650  2,722,755 1,411,075 1,547,375 2,143,623 3,496,875 2,273,175 15,079,998 
4 Germany 1,600,000 1,584,785 1,056,604 2,964,960 1,500,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,271,740 1,300,000  13,878,088 
5 Japan   10,000,000       180,000 10,180,000 
6 Qatar 2,000,000 4,000,000  4,000,000       10,000,000 
7Australia 7,304,974    456,900 481,700 495,750  473,100  9,212,424 
8 Spain  1,059,080 1,231,133 1,211,915 1,388,504 54,540 57,823  57,823 20,553 5,023,547 
9 France 588,100 629,350 656,550 1,913,316 1,006,400      4,793,716 
10 Italy   1,485,400 1,462,400       2,947,800 
11 Republic of Korea  1,000,000         1,000,000 
12 United Kingdom 609,350          609,350 
13 Poland 50,000 50,000 100,000    30,000 158,510 129,504  518,014 
14 Romania   294,260 128,600       422,860 
15 Chile 20,000 80,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 340,000 
16 Denmark  265,018         265,018 
17 Turkey   50,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 30,000  205,000 
18 Czech Republic 50,000  84,100 61,681       195,780 
19 Portugal 50,000   100,000       150,000 
20 Slovenia 30,000 30,000 20,000 20,000 27,924      127,924 
21 Senegal 100,000          100,000 
22 Hungary 25,000  25,000  25,000      75,000 
23 Croatia 5,000  20,000 22,000 24,000      71,000 
24 Israel  17,500 10,000 10,000 10,000 5,000 5,000    57,500 
25 Peru   20,000 5,000    10,000 20,000  55,000 
26 Lithuania   13,278 15,642   10,412 10,000   49,332 
27 Georgia  24,943         24,943 
28 Panama      7,000 5,000 5,000 5,000  22,000 
29 Argentina       5,000 5,000  5,000 15,000 
30 Estonia  10,395         10,395 
31 Bulgaria   10,000        10,000 
32 Libya          10,000 10,000 
33 Mongolia  10,000         10,000 
34 Cyprus   5,000        5,000 
35 Ecuador     5,000       5,000 
36 Iraq      5,000     5,000 
37 Latvia    5,000       5,000 
38 Madagascar       5,000     5,000 
39 Morocco     5,000      5,000 
40 Sri Lanka 5,000          5,000 
Total 27,437,424 22,410,520 15,866,974 24,900,514 15,221,503 7,824,315 13,453,537 13,181,696 11,938,575 2,498,175 154,733,232 
Source: UNDEF
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Table 1.2 - UNDEF Projects implemented by civil society or CSOs at local level 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2006-
2012 
Number of Countries 53 60 46 43 53 60 40 111 
Number of civil society/NGOs 
Projects over the total number of 
projects 
60/95 59/61 47/48 47/48 54/54 61/62 37/37 365/405 
Amount approved 
(in dollars) 
Mean 319,595 296,810 280,675 280,366 227,978 205,957 251,250 266,090 
Min 50,000 90,000 125,000 60,000 125,000 60,000 230,000 50,000 
Max 350,000 400,000 400,000 400,000 500,000 360,000 275,000 500,000 
Source: own calculations from UNDEF projects database 
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Table 1.3 - Data description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Democracy Revised Combined Polity IV score ranging from -
10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). 
Centre for Systemic Peace  
GDP per capita  Real GDP. US Dollars at constant prices (2005) 
and constant exchange rates (2005) per capita. 
UNCTAD   
ODA per capita  Total official development assistance net. US 
Dollars at current prices and current exchange 
rates in millions per capita. 
UNCTAD   
Urban Population Percentage of urban population. UNCTAD   
Press Freedom Freedom of the Press Index ranging from 0 (not 
free) to 100 (free). 
Freedom House 
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Table 1.4 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Democracy 102 0.53 2.79 -10 12 
GDP per capita (logged) 102 6.95 1.06 4.82 8.94 
ODA per capita (logged) 102 3.06 1.17 0.14 5.51 
Urban Population 102 44.59 19.99 8.30 93.61 
Press Freedom 102 43.66 19.46 3.83 83.83 
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Table 1.5 - ATT matching estimate of CSOs projects on democracy 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E T-stat 
Democracy Unmatched 0.63 0.06 0.58 0.72 0.79 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
a round 
ATT 0.72 -0.02 0.74 0.61 1.21 
Democracy Unmatched 0.74 0.14 0.60 0.58 1.04 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
two rounds 
ATT 0.69 -0.59 1.29 0.86 1.50 
Democracy Unmatched 0.98 0.19 0.79 0.56 1.42 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
three 
rounds 
ATT 0.98 -0.30 1.28 0.61 2.07 
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Table 1.6 - Covariate imbalance among treated and control countries before and 
after matching  
 Unmatched Mean  %reduct t-test V(T)/ 
Variable Matched Treated Controls %bias |bias| t p>|t| V(C) 
GDP 
U 6.6984 7.1382 -42.3  -2.11 0.038 0.85 
M 6.6984 6.6759 2.2 94.9 0.10 0.918 0.91 
ODA 
U 2.944 3.1548 -18.1  -0.90 0.368 0.92 
M 2.944 3.0901 -12.5 30.7 -0.59 0.556 0.94 
Urban 
Pop. 
U 42.616 46.094 -17.3  -0.87 0.387 1.15 
M 42.616 43.59 -4.8 72.0 -0.23 0.821 1.15 
Press 
Freedom 
U 42.295 44.698 -12.6  -0.62 0.540 0.50* 
M 42.295 42.22 0.4 96.8 0.02 0.985 0.53* 
* if variance ratio outside [0.55; 1.83] for U and [0.55; 1.83] for M 
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Table 1.7 - ATT matching estimate using a probit model 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E T-stat 
Democracy Unmatched 0.63 0.06 0.58 0.73 0.79 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
a round 
ATT 0.73 0.04 0.69 0.61 1.14 
Democracy Unmatched 0.74 0.14 0.60 0.58 1.04 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
two rounds 
ATT 0.69 -0.65 1.34 0.86 1.56 
Democracy Unmatched 0.98 0.19 0.79 0.56 1.42 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
three 
rounds 
ATT 0.97 -0.30 1.27 0.61 2.06 
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Table 1.8 - ATT estimates using nearest neighbour matching 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E T-stat 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
a round 
ATT 
n=5 0.72 0.20 0.52 0.58 0.90 
ATT 
n=10 0.72 -0.02 0.73 0.55 1.35 
ATT 
n=20 0.72 0.06 0.66 0.50 1.33 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
two rounds 
ATT 
n=5 0.69 -0.45 1.14 0.77 1.48 
ATT 
n=10 0.69 -0.23 0.93 0.70 1.32 
ATT 
n=20 0.69 0.04 0.65 0.67 0.98 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
three 
rounds 
ATT 
n=5 0.98 -0.45 1.42 0.65 2.21 
ATT 
n=10 0.98 -0.39 1.37 0.63 2.18 
ATT 
n=20 0.98 -0.27 1.25 0.61 2.06 
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Table 1.9 - ATT estimates using the normal and the tricube kernel functions 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E T-stat 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
a round 
ATT 
normal 
kernel 
0.72 -0.04 0.75 0.54 1.41 
ATT 
tricube 
kernel 
0.73 0.13 0.59 0.62 0.94 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
two rounds 
ATT 
normal 
kernel 
0.69 -0.45 1.14 0.73 1.55 
ATT 
tricube 
kernel 
0.69 -0.63 1.32 0.88 1.51 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
three 
rounds 
ATT 
normal 
kernel 
0.98 -0.26 1.24 0.60 2.06 
ATT 
tricube 
kernel 
0.98 -0.30 1.28 0.62 2.06 
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Table 1.10 - ATT estimates using different bandwidth parameters 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E T-stat 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
a round 
ATT 
bw=0.04 0.73 0.06 0.46 0.68 0.67 
ATT 
bw=0.08 0.72 -0.13 0.84 0.58 1.44 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
two rounds 
ATT 
bw=0.04 0.72 -0.75 1.47 0.89 1.65 
ATT 
bw=0.08 0.69 -0.57 1.26 0.82 1.53 
Countries 
benefiting 
for at least 
three 
rounds 
ATT 
bw=0.04 0.98 -0.29 1.27 0.62 2.04 
ATT 
bw=0.08 0.98 -0.29 1.27 0.61 2.08 
 
 
  
45 
 
Figure 1.1 - Polity IV regimes in 2005  
 
Source: own calculations from Polity IV Projects data  
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Figure 1.2 - Polity IV regimes in 2012 
  
Source: own calculations from Polity IV Projects data  
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Figure 1.3 - Treated and control countries considering at least a round 
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Figure 1.4 - Treated and control countries considering at least two rounds 
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Figure 1.5 - Treated and control countries considering at least three rounds 
 
 
Source: own calculations from UNDEF projects database 
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Figure 1.6 - Distribution of treated and control countries on the basis of the 
propensity score considering at least three rounds 
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Figure 1.7 - Boxplots of pre-matching estimated propensity score for treated and 
control countries considering at least three rounds 
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Figure 1.8 - Boxplots of post-matching estimated propensity score for treated and 
control countries considering at least three rounds 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1.A.1 - UNDEF projects implemented by civil society or NGOs at local 
level 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Country 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Afghanistan 350,000 1 400,000 1 350,000 1 135,000 1 300,000 1     
Albania     300,000 1 180,000 1     150,000 1     
Algeria             175,000 1         
Angola             325,000 1         
Argentina 300,000 1 100,000 1 325,000 1             
Armenia 280,997 1                 200,000 1 
Azerbaijan     200,000 1     200,000 1 220,000 1 225,000 1 
Bangladesh     150,000 1 325,000 1 275,000 1 200,000 1 250,000 1 
Belize                 n/a 1     
Benin             300,000 1 250,000 1     
Bhutan         225,000 1             
Bolivia 350,000 1         350,000 1 n/a 1     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 279,759 1 150,000 1         125,000 1     
Brazil 350,000 1 300,000 1     250,000 1         
Bulgaria 113,085 1                     
Burkina Faso         150,000 1     175,000 1 110,000 1 
Burundi 302,450 1 225,000 1 500,000 2 500,000 2 250,000 1 200,000 1 
Cabo Verde                         
Cambodia 346,150 1 300,000 1     325,000 1 200,000 1 130,000 1 
Cameroon     375,000 1     250,000 1 200,000 1 175,000 1 
Chad     150,000 1             200,000 1 
Chile         250,000 1     175,000 1     
China             505,000 2     225,000 1 
Colombia     350,000 1 220,000 1 180,000 1         
Congo, Dem, 
Rep, 248,951 1 325,000 1 400,000 2         175,000 1 
Congo, Rep, of   250,000 1         
Costa Rica 299,888 1                 250,000 1 
Cote d'Ivoire     125,000 1 250,000 1 225,000 1     200,000 1 
Djibouti                     200,000 1 
Dominican 
Republic                     n/a 1 
Ecuador     350,000 1 400,000 1             
Egypt, Arab 
Rep,     350,000 1 300,000 1 250,000 1 n/a 1 n/a 1 
Continued on next page 
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… table 1.A.1 continued 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Country 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
El Salvador 339,500 1 300,000 1             250,000 1 
Ethiopia     400,000 1                 
Fiji                     n/a 1 
Gabon         125,000 1         200,000 1 
Gambia             175,000 1 225,000 1     
Georgia 333,550 1         165,000 1 n/a 1 115,000 1 
Ghana 270,000 1 350,000 1 250,000 1 400,000 1 175,000 1     
Guatemala 591,675 2 150,000 1 300,000 1     175,000 1 n/a 1 
Guinea     400,000 1         200,000 1     
Guinea-Bissau 350,000 1                     
Haiti         350,000 1     225,000 1     
Honduras     400,000 1     300,000 1     225,000 1 
India 589,218 2 350,000 1 350,000 1 320,000 1 725,000 2 250,000 1 
Indonesia  208,301 2 300,000 1 350,000 1 225,000 1     200,000 1 
Iraq 959,533 3 400,000 1 450,000 2 200,000 1 225,000 1     
Israel 349,540 1                     
Jamaica     300,000 1 125,000 1             
Jordan     400,000 1         n/a 1     
Kazakhstan     300,000 1 175,000 1 200,000 1     250,000 1 
Kenya     350,000 1 250,000 1 475,000 2 225,000 1 225,000 1 
Kosovo 296,800 1 400,000 1 325,000 1 200,000 1     250,000 1 
Kyrgyz 
Republic         300,000 1     225,000 1 120,000 1 
Lao PDR             375,000 1 200,000 1 250,000 1 
Lebanon         375,000 1     400,000 2 n/a 1 
Liberia     300,000 1     180,000 1         
Libya                     225,000 1 
Macedonia, 
FYR     90,000 1                 
Madagascar                         
Malawi     300,000 1             175,000 1 
Malaysia                         
Maldives                 264,000 1     
Mali 300,000 1 350,000 1                 
Mauritania                 225,000 1     
Mauritius             60,000 1         
Mexico         375,000 1 325,000 1 225,000 1 175,000 1 
Continued on next page 
 
55 
 
 
… table 1.A.1 continued 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Country 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Moldova 207,000 1     150,000 1     225,000 1 200,000 1 
Mongolia         300,000 1         175,000 1 
Morocco     250,000 1             275,000 1 
Mozambique     300,000 1 350,000 1     250,000 1 200,000 1 
Myanmar     300,000 1     250,000 1         
Nepal 350,000 1 350,000 1 300,000 1 275,000 1 275,000 1 n/a 1 
Nicaragua                     250,000 1 
Niger     100,000 1             175,000 1 
Nigeria 339,550 1 225,000 1 325,000 1 295,000 1 200,000 1     
Pakistan 232,300 1 325,000 1 225,000 1 250,000 1 475,000 2 225,000 1 
Palestine 563,976 2 300,000 1 220,000 1 325,000 1 150,000 1 180,000 1 
Panama 294,521 1                     
Papua New 
Guinea 224,000 1 350,000 1                 
Paraguay 273,000 1     250,000 1     200,000 1     
Peru 264,784 1         530,000 2     n/a 1 
Philippines 349,125 1 300,000 1 250,000 1     225,000 1 200,000 1 
Romania 267,375 1 250,000 1                 
Russian 
Federation 224,000 1 350,000 1     405,000 2 175,000 1 200,000 2 
Rwanda 256,375 1         385,000 2     100,000 1 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 339,839 1                     
Senegal 259,017 1 225,000 1 250,000 1     275,000 1     
Serbia 627,161 2 350,000 1         125,000 1     
Sierra Leone 698,959 2 350,000 1 250,000 1     225,000 1 360,000 2 
Somalia     200,000 1     110,000 1 150,000 1     
South Africa 350,000 1                     
South Sudan                     n/a 1 
Sri Lanka         225,000 1         n/a 1 
Sudan 50,000 1             n/a 1     
Tajikistan 180,875 1             225,000 1 175,000 1 
Tanzania     300,000 1     225,000 1     n/a 1 
Thailand 230,000 1 400,000 1                 
Timor-Leste 80,740 1 300,000 1             275,000 1 
Togo 302,680 1 325,000 1 250,000 1         225,000 1 
Tonga                     60,000 1 
Continued on next page 
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… table 1.A.1 continued 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Country 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Total amount 
approved 
(dollars) and 
number of 
projects 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 262,500 1                     
Tunisia                 150,000 1 305,000 2 
Turkey     350,000 1 230,000 1             
Turkmenistan                         
Uganda 324,351 2 250,000 1 250,000 1     225,000 1 225,000 1 
Ukraine 216,752 1     299,700 1 275,000 1 175,000 1 n/a 1 
Uzbekistan                     200,000 1 
Vanuatu 107,776 1                     
Vietnam                 175,000 1     
Yemen 347,303 1 225,000 1     325,000 1 200,000 1     
Zimbabwe 266,000 1 300,000 1 250,000 1     200,000 1 225,000 1 
Source: UNDEF projects database 
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Table 1.A.2 - List of treated and control countries considering at least three 
rounds 
Country Status Country Status Country Status 
Albania Treated Gambia Control Myanmar Control 
Algeria Control Georgia Treated Namibia Control 
Angola Control Ghana Treated Nepal Treated 
Argentina Treated Guatemala Treated Nicaragua Control 
Armenia Control Guinea Control Niger Control 
Azerbaijan Treated Guinea Bissau Control Nigeria Treated 
Bangladesh Treated Guyana Control Pakistan Treated 
Belarus Control Haiti Control Panama Control 
Benin Control Honduras Treated Papua New Guinea Control 
Bhutan Control India Treated Paraguay Treated 
Bolivia Treated Indonesia Treated Peru Treated 
Botswana Control Iran Control Philippines Treated 
Brazil Treated Jamaica Control Rwanda Treated 
Burkina Faso Treated Jordan Control Senegal Treated 
Burundi Treated Kazakhstan Treated Sierra Leone Treated 
Cambodia Treated Kenya Treated Somalia Treated 
Cameroon Treated Kyrgyzstan Treated South Africa Control 
Cape Verde Control Lao PDR Treated Sri Lanka Control 
Central African 
Republic 
Control Lebanon Treated Suriname Control 
Chad Control Lesotho Control Swaziland Control 
Colombia Treated Liberia Control Syrian Arab Rep. Control 
Comoros Control Libya Control Tajikistan Treated 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Treated Macedonia, FYR Control Tanzania Treated 
Republic of the 
Congo 
Control Madagascar Control Thailand Control 
Costa Rica Control  Malawi Control Togo Treated 
Cuba Control  Malaysia Control Turkey Control 
Djibouti Control Mali Control Turkmenistan Control 
Dominican Republic Control Mauritania Control Uganda Treated 
Ecuador Control Mauritius Control Ukraine Treated 
El Salvador Treated Mexico Treated Uzbekistan Control 
Eritrea Control Moldova Treated Vietnam Control 
Ethiopia Control Mongolia Control Yemen Treated 
Fiji Control Morocco Control Zambia Control 
Gabon Control Mozambique Treated Zimbabwe Treated 
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Figure 1.A.1 - Boxplot of the covariate imbalance among treated and control 
countries 
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2. Oil discoveries and democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The effect of natural resources on political regimes is evaluated, using the synthetic control 
method to compare the evolution of the democracy level of countries that experienced giant 
oil discoveries with the weighted democracy level of countries that do not incur the same 
event and have similar pre-event characteristics. Focusing on 12 countries that have 
reached the peak of oil discoveries from the 1970s, the exogenous variation in oil 
endowment does not have the same effect on all countries. In most cases, the event has a 
negative effect in the long run, but countries with a high level of democracy in the pre-
event period are not affected by the peak of oil discoveries. These results support 
heterogeneity and non-linearities claimed in recent theoretical literature. 
 
 
Keywords: natural resources, oil discoveries, democracy, synthetic control method 
JEL classification: P16, P48, C21, C23, O57  
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2.1 Introduction 
Natural resources such as minerals, oil, and gas are a source of rent for a state. 
However, there is strong evidence that large endowments of natural resources may 
reduce economic growth and are associated with non-democratic regimes. This 
problem is often called a ‘resources curse’.1 The explanation for this perverse 
outcome is the public sector: politicians use rents from natural resources as a tool 
to remain in power. For example, a job in the public sector may be offered in 
exchange for a vote, or simply as acceptance of the status quo in a non-democratic 
regime. In addition, so-called white elephant projects (expensive, below capacity, 
and therefore unsustainable over time) are another example of waste of public 
monies accrued from extractive resources. Overall, the excessive expansion of the 
public sector leads to inefficiency. Moreover, a growing mining sector with high 
profits tends to attract capital, reducing its availability for investments in other 
industries. First, this lowers funds for other profitable but less politically linked 
companies; second, it reduces diversification and exposes the country to 
idiosyncratic shocks in the resource-abundant sector. Both can hamper economic 
growth in the medium term. 
The phenomenon of a resource curse is not unanimously supported. For 
example, claims have been made that it can be escaped by countries with good 
institutions. This paper takes heterogeneity2 across countries seriously: we perform 
a data-driven analysis that, instead of calculating the average effect of natural 
resources across countries, compares for each country the actual political regime 
with the counterfactual in the absence of a natural resource shock. In our analysis, 
this shock is when oil wealth reaches its peak and therefore the value of political 
incumbency is the highest, a central tenet in the ‘rentier model’ introduced in the 
next section. More precisely, we apply the synthetic control method (SCM) 
developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and extended in Abadie et al. (2010), 
to deal with endogeneity from omitted variable bias by accounting for the presence 
                                                          
1 For comprehensive reviews, see van der Ploeg (2011) and Ross (2015). 
2 Robinson et al. (2006: 451) claim: ‘For every Venezuela and Nigeria, there is a Norway or a 
Botswana. A satisfactory model should explain why resources seem to induce prosperity in some 
countries but not others’. 
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of unobservable time-varying confounders. Moreover, it has the added advantage 
of transparency (as the weights identify the countries used to estimate the 
counterfactual outcome) as well as flexibility (as the set of potential controls can be 
appropriately restricted to make the underlying country comparisons more 
reasonable). 
The choice of the natural resource measure is critical, as exogeneity is a pre-
requisite for a meaningful claim of causality. Oil production, the typical measure of 
natural resource abundance, is imperfect because production is non-monotonic over 
the lifecycle of any oilfield. Therefore, this is a poor indicator of oil wealth. 
Following Tsui (2011), we use the exogenous variation in oil endowment to provide 
evidence that does not suffer from the endogeneity problem. In particular, we 
evaluate the effect of the peak of oil discoveries, defined as the point in time after 
which the rate of oilfield discoveries begins to decline. We argue that this event is 
more plausibly exogenous than the initial discovery of oil as it depends more on 
geological factors than on exploration. Our findings are in line with the literature 
suggesting that the effect of natural resources on democracy depends on the quality 
of institutions (Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006). In countries with a high 
level of democracy (e.g. India and Colombia), it does not decline, as it does in 
countries with low levels of democracy. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on natural 
resources and political regimes; Section 3 presents the methodology; in Section 4 
data and some tests on exogeneity are introduced. Section 5 shows the results and 
robustness checks are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.2 Natural resources and political regimes 
In contrast with the first wave of models (Krugman 1987; Sachs and Warner 1999), 
and those based on rent-seeking (Lane and Tornell 1996; Torvik 2002) involving 
an unconditional and negative relationship between resource abundance and 
growth, a fairly standard result is that countries with good institutions are able to 
use resource rents to improve their economic performance. This is because well-
developed institutions have enough checks and balances to prevent the predatory 
behaviour of politicians and the unproductive use of government expenditure. 
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Democracy is the political system that seeks to maximise accountability and the 
peaceful change of government and we therefore take it to stand  for ‘good 
institutions’. The most common argument linking more oil to less democracy is the 
“rentier effect”: an abundant flow of oil revenues enables incumbents to reduce 
taxes and/or increase patronage and public goods, making it possible for them to 
buy off a larger set of potential challengers and reduce dissent (Ross 2001). 
Moreover, higher non-tax revenues allow autocrats to reduce taxation and attenuate 
demands for greater accountability that would emerge from the imposition of 
heavier taxes or reduced subsidies (Brautigam et al. 2008). 
In the rentier model resource wealth does not affect the preferences of rulers 
but it does influence their ability to act on these preferences. Robinson et al. (2006) 
and Caselli and Cunningham (2009) claim that higher resources increase the value 
leaders place on remaining in office because resource rents make incumbency more 
valuable, inducing a ruler to invest more in regime-preserving activities. There is 
substantial evidence that oil strengthens authoritarian governments and prevents a 
transition to democracy: Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) show that oil wealth 
prolongs the survival in office of authoritarian rulers, while Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith (2010) find that natural resource rents help authoritarian leaders to avoid 
revolutionary threats and to survive them when they occur. Moreover, oil-rich 
autocrats may spend extra resource rents in repression (Cotet and Tsui 2013) and 
on the military to buy loyalty (Wright et al. 2015). 
The impact of oil wealth on democracies is more ambiguous. A number of 
studies claim that oil has pro-democratic effects in democracies, because it makes 
governments more stable (reducing the likelihood of a transition to autocracy) or 
improves democracy scores (Smith 2004, Tsui 2011). A second group of studies 
finds no evidence that oil helps to stabilize democratic regimes (e.g., Andersen and 
Aslaksen 2013). Finally, other studies suggest that the effect of oil on democratic 
stability is conditional: it may stabilize democracies that are wealthy and have 
strong institutions but foster the breakdown of accountability in poorer democracies 
or ones with weaker institutions (e.g., Ross 2012).  
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The effect of ‘good institutions’ on the resource curse has been analysed in 
a number of papers that have emphasised accountability and rule of law as pillars 
for the effective use of natural resources. 
According to Robinson et al. (2006), politicians tend to over-extract natural 
resources because they overly discount the future. This raises the value of 
incumbency and provides politicians with more resources to influence election 
results and increase resource misallocation in the economy. Countries with 
institutions that promote accountability and competence tend to benefit from 
resource booms, as these institutions reduce the perverse political incentives that 
such booms create. Similarly, as Mehlum et al. (2006) show, the quality of 
institutions determines whether countries avoid the resource curse. Taken together, 
these results conflict with Sachs and Warner’s (1999) claim that institutions are 
irrelevant for the resource curse. 
Natural resources make it more difficult for citizens to take collective action  
against a kleptocrat because they provide rulers with substantial resources to buy 
off opponents. Acemoglu et al. (2004) say that the success of a kleptocrat lies in his 
ability to use a divide-and-rule strategy. Members of society need to co-operate in 
order to depose the kleptocrat, but this co-operation may be neutralized by imposing 
punitive taxation on opponents and by redistributing the proceeds to allies. In 
equilibrium, all citizens are exploited and the kleptocrat remains unchallenged.  
Empirical evidence for the political resource curse has focused mainly on 
the use of panel data, and the quality of institutions has often been proxied by 
corruption. The link goes from resource availability to corruption and rent-seeking 
via protection, exclusive licences to exploit and export resources given by the 
political elite to oligarchs in order to capture wealth and political power. Resource 
dependence is indeed strongly associated with a worse corruption perception index, 
which in turn is associated with lower growth (Mauro 1995), and natural resource 
wealth stimulates corruption among bureaucrats and politicians (Ades and Di Tella 
1999). According to Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), natural resources induce 
corruption in countries that have been in a non-democratic regime for more than 60 
per cent of the years since 1956. Along the same lines, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) 
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claim that high natural resource rents and open democratic systems slow growth 
unless there are sufficient checks and balances.  
A new line of empirical research involves quasi-experimental studies. 
Vicente (2010) compares changes in perceived corruption in Sao Tome, which 
announced a significant oil discovery in 1997–99, with those in Cape Verde, with 
no oil. The two locations have a similar history, culture, and political institutions. 
He finds that corruption increased by almost 10 per cent after the announcement of 
the oil discovery and slightly decreased thereafter. In a regression-discontinuity 
study not explicitly related to natural resources, Brollo et al. (2013) find that 
windfall government revenues in Brazilian municipalities increase corruption and 
strengthen incumbency,  but adversely affect the quality of politicians. 
Our analysis follows the insights of Tsui (2011) and Lei and Michaels 
(2014) in choosing oil discoveries as the main variable related with the resource 
curse is concerned.  Tsui (2011) argues that oil production—the typical measure of 
natural resource abundance—is noisy. Owing to geological constraints, the 
production rate is non-monotonic over the lifecycle of an oilfield; therefore, 
production is not a good indicator of the remaining reserves and oil wealth (the 
capital value of future oil rent, and hence a stock variable). Moreover, production 
understates the oil wealth of swing producers who produce below their capacity. 
Oil exploration involves high risks: with the current technology, the success rate of 
exploration drilling is still below 50 per cent, and historically has been much lower 
(Cotet and Tsui, 2013). It is therefore plausible to treat oil discoveries as positive 
oil shocks, whose timing and size are more exogenous than oil production. 
Moreover, the size of the deposit, quality, and other cost-determining characteristics 
are exogenous.3 Using an empirical strategy based on an instrumental variables 
approach, Tsui (2011) finds that larger oil discoveries cause slower transitions to 
democracy; however, there is no such effect in democratic countries. This is 
positively correlated with oil quality and negatively correlated with exploration and 
extraction costs. Lei and Michaels (2014) focus on the discovery of giant oilfields, 
                                                          
3 Moreover, there is empirical evidence that bad political conditions lead to less oil exploration and 
production (Bohn and Deacon, 2000; Ross 2012). Hence, oil levels tend to be biased downward in 
countries with less democracy and more conflict, reducing the risk of positive bias. 
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each of which contained ultimate recoverable reserves of 500 million barrels 
equivalent or more before extraction began. They show that in a panel of countries, 
controlling for country and time fixed effects, the timing of giant oilfield 
discoveries is plausibly exogenous, at least in the short-medium run. They do not 
analyse the effect of oil discoveries on democracy, but find that giant oilfield 
discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed conflicts by about 5-8 percent 
within 4-8 years of discovery.4 
For comparability, we use the variable devised by Tsui (2011), but take a 
fundamentally different approach. His method produces average effects of oil 
discoveries on the level of democracy, whereas ours gives the effect in each treated 
country. Therefore, his approach is more general but conceals differences across 
countries. Our methodology returns the country-specific effect at the price of 
concentrating on a few cases. The approaches are complementary. 
Our methodology was applied, in addition to panel difference-in-
differences, in a study by Smith (2015) using resource discovery in countries that 
were not previously resource-rich as a plausible exogenous source of variation. He 
finds a positive effect on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita levels in non-
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, and 
conflicting evidence of the long-run positive effect of resources on productivity, 
capital formation, and education. 
 
2.3 The synthetic control approach 
The SCM provides quantitative inference in small-sample comparative studies by 
estimating the counterfactual situation of one or several aggregate entities in the 
absence of an event or intervention (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 
2010). The missing counterfactual outcome is given by the weighted outcome of all 
                                                          
4 There are a number of differences between these approaches. First, Tsui includes only oil 
discoveries, whilst Lei and Michaels (2014) also include natural gas and condensate. Second, Cotet 
and Tsui (2013) aggregate reserves from all discoveries within a country in a given year, while  Lei 
and Michaels (2014) use only the largest single discovery. According to Lei and Michaels (2014), 
the correlation between their indicator for giant oilfield discoveries and the indicator used by Cotet 
and Tsui (2013) is around 0.55. 
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potential comparison units that best reproduces the characteristics of the case of 
interest (Abadie et al. 2015). In our case, we compare the democracy level of 
countries  with a peak of oil discoveries with the weighted democracy level of 
countries where the peak of oil discoveries has not been reached but with similar 
pre-event characteristics.  
To frame the SCM in the context of the present study, assume that there is 
a balanced panel of I+1 countries indexed by i and observed over T years. Among 
these, country i=1 (treated unit) reaches the peak of oil discoveries at time T0<T; 
the remaining I countries are not affected by giant oil discoveries (donor pool). The 
effect of the event is given by: 
 [2.1] 
where t>T0, Y1t is the observed outcome of country i=1 for a post-event period t, 
and 𝑌ଵ௧ே is the unobservable potential outcome of country i=1, the democracy level 
that would have been observed in the absence of the event. SCM estimates 𝑌ଵ௧ே by 
defining a weighted average of the donor pool (synthetic control). The estimator of 
1 at time t is given by the difference between the outcome of the treated unit and 
the outcome of the synthetic control at that period: 
                                      𝛼ොଵ௧ =  𝑌ଵ௧ − ∑ 𝑤௜∗𝑌௜௧ூାଵ௜ୀଶ                                       [2.2] 
The weights 𝑤௜∗ are chosen such that the characteristics (predictors) of the 
treated unit are best reproduced by the characteristics of the synthetic control. More 
formally, let X1k be the pre-event value of the kth democracy predictor for the treated 
unit, and let X0k be a (1I) vector of the pre-event values of the same variable kth 
for the units in the donor pool. Then, the vector W* containing the weights assigned 
to each control unit is chosen in order to minimise the following sum: 
 
 [2.3] 
1t =Y1t -Y1tN
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subject to wi0 and ∑ 𝑤௜ூ௜ୀଶ =1.5 Here, nk is a weight that reflects the predictive 
power of variable k. In the following analysis, we choose the positive semi-definite 
and diagonal matrix V using the data-driven procedure implemented by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010): V minimises the mean squared 
prediction error (MSPE) of the outcome variable in the pre-event period. MSPE 
measures the expected squared distance between the outcome of the treated unit and 
the outcome of the synthetic control in the pre-event period.6 Thus, the lower the 
MSPE, the more the synthetic control resembles the characteristic of the treated 
unit. To achieve lower MSPE, we implement the nested optimisation procedure that 
searches among all V matrices and sets of W weights for the best fitting convex 
combination of the units in the donor pool. Moreover, to ensure that the global 
minimum in the parameter space has been found, we run the nested optimisation 
using three different starting points of V.7 
This data-driven procedure reduces discretion in the choice of the 
comparison units and has the advantage of transparency by making explicit the 
relative contribution of each unit in the donor pool to the counterfactual outcome. 
In addition, SCM allows the unobserved variables affecting the outcome to change 
over time. When there is a large number of pre-event periods, only those units that 
are similar in both observed and unobserved characteristics should produce similar 
paths for the outcome under scrutiny. Therefore, if the trajectories of the democracy 
level of the treated unit and the synthetic control are alike over numerous years prior 
to the peak in oil discoveries, a divergence in the outcome variable in the following 
years should be interpreted as produced by the peak itself. 
These conclusions cannot be validated by the traditional modes of statistical 
inference because of the small-sample nature of the data. However, Abadie et al. 
(2010) provide an alternative model of inference defined as ‘placebo studies’ based 
                                                          
5 This restriction prevents extrapolation outside the support of the data. See Abadie et al. (2015) 
for a discussion of its relevance. 
6 . 
7 The three starting points are the regression-based V, the equal V weights, and a third procedure that 
uses the Stata maximum likelihood search. The nested optimization procedure is implemented by 
the Stata module synth (Abadie et al. 2011). 
MSPE = 1 T0( )åt<T0 Y1t -åi=2I+1 wi*Yit( )
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on the premise that the impact of the event under analysis would be undermined if 
an estimated effect of similar or greater magnitude were obtained in cases where 
the intervention did not take place. In particular, placebo studies apply SCM to 
every country in the pool of potential controls. This aims to assess whether the 
estimated effect for the treated country is large compared to the effect in a country 
chosen at random. In this study, ‘in-space placebo tests’ are used to compare the 
estimated treatment effect for each country that reaches the peak of oil discoveries 
with all the (fake) treatment effects of the control countries, obtained from 
experiments where each control country is assumed to be affected by the same event 
in the same year as the treated country. If the estimated effect in the treated country 
is larger than most of the effects obtained by the (fake) experiments, it can safely 
be concluded that the baseline results are not driven randomly by chance. This 
means that if the path of the post-event level of democracy in our case studies falls 
well outside the distribution of placebo effects, we attribute that effect to the peak 
of oil discoveries.  
 
2.4 Democracy, predictors, and event periods 
We measure the level of democracy using the polity2 indicator from the Polity IV 
dataset (Marshall et al. 2014), which provides a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). To scale down the 
variance and reduce the effect of outliers, we transform the variable to lie between 
0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the highest level of democracy. 
The set of predictors includes factors the literature identifies as determinants 
of democracy. We take into account the relationship between political regimes and 
economic factors including the log of GDP per capita (Gdp).8 We also include a set 
of additional variables related to economic development that may predict a 
country’s democratic level (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Barro 1999; Lipset 
1959): the index of human capital (human capital); the sum of imports and exports 
                                                          
8 Several studies corroborate the results of the seminal work of Lipset (1959) according to which 
economic development consolidates democracy. Real gross domestic product on the expenditure 
side is used, since it enables a comparison of living standards across countries and over time 
(Feenstra et al. 2015). 
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over GDP (openness); and the value added by the mining,9 manufacturing, and 
primary sectors as a percentage of GDP. In addition, we consider the hostility level 
of interstate disputes (hostility), and the total amount of natural resource rents as a 
percentage of GDP (total rents), to control for the possible effects of both conflicts 
and natural resource rents. Finally, we include the average level of democracy 
calculated in the 10 years preceding the event under scrutiny, to capture the quality 
of pre-existing institutions.  
Following Tsui (2011), we identify the year of the event exploiting the oil 
production and depletion dataset collected by Campbell (2006). This dataset 
contains information on the peak year of oil discoveries for the top 65 oil countries. 
We consider that year as the period in which the event under scrutiny takes place.  
The predictors are averaged over a 10-year pre-event period,10 and the path 
of the outcome variable is analysed until 2014. Owing to data availability, we 
restrict our analysis to countries affected by the peak in the 1970s or later.11 We 
also exclude the developed countries that do not show any variation in the Polity 
score in the time span considered.12 Table 2.1 shows the countries analysed and the 
year in which they reached the peak of oil discoveries, and Appendix Table 2.A.1 
lists the events excluded. For each treated unit, the donor pool encompasses all the 
countries not affected by the event for which data are available. Table 2.2 provides 
the definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics of variables.  
 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
                                                          
9 The value added by the mining sector is obtained subtracting manufacturing from the variable 
‘mining, manufacturing, utilities’ taken from the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development) database. The noise of utilities in the measurement of the mining sector is small 
(Caruso et al. 2014). 
10 Data on total rents, mining, manufacturing, and primary are available from 1970. Hence, the time 
span over which they are averaged is different from the 10-year pre-event period for those countries 
that reached the peak in the 1970s: Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Tunisia, and 
Vietnam. 
11 Angola, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen are excluded because of the lack of pre-
event data. 
12 These countries are Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
To check whether the characteristics that predict the democracy level are 
also able to predict the peak of oil discoveries, we run cross-sectional linear 
regressions.13 The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the country reached the peak 
of oil discoveries after 1970, and 0 otherwise. Predictors are measured at 1970. 
Table 2.3 shows the results. All the predictors are insignificant except for human 
capital and openness, whose coefficients are both negative and significant at 1 and 
10 per cent, respectively. However, considering multivariate regression, only the 
initial level of human capital is a significant predictor of the peak of oil discoveries. 
The reason for this unusual result may be our sample which does not include 
developed countries (such as the UK and Norway) that are rich in oil. These 
countries have a high level of human capital. However, this result does not 
invalidate our analysis since SCM enables countries that have pre-event 
characteristics dissimilar to the treated unit to be discarded.14 
  
[Table 2.3 about here] 
 
2.5 Results 
As highlighted in the previous sections, the credibility of SCM hinges on its ability 
to match the pre-event outcome of the treated country with that of the synthetic 
control. Table 2.4 reports the predictor balance and the root mean square prediction 
error (RMSPE) for each of our case studies. The low values of the RMSPE confirm 
the strengths of the synthetic control estimator. However, the RMSPE is higher than 
0.10 for Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand. Because such a magnitude is deemed too 
high for a good fit between the path of the outcome variable of the treated unit and 
its synthetic control, these countries are discarded in the following discussion.  
                                                          
13 Smith (2015) uses linear regressions to show that oil discoveries do not depend on the initial 
characteristics that may affect future growth. 
14 As can be seen in Table A2, developed countries are not usually included in the synthetic 
control, and when they are, a very small weight (with the exception of Japan/for India) is used. 
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[Table 2.4 about here] 
 
Figures 2.1–2.12 provide a graphic illustration of the results: panels (a) 
display the trajectories of democracy level in each country and their synthetic 
counterparts, whereas the panels (b) show the gap between the two. Appendix Table 
2.A.2 lists the potential controls and the weight assigned to each country in the 
synthetic control. 
 
[Figures 2.1 – 2.12 about here] 
 
The main finding is that oil discoveries do not affect all countries in the 
same way. Most of the case studies present a negative outcome gap in the long run. 
Figure 2.2 shows that the level of democracy of Cameroon is slightly lower than 
the synthetic control after the peak of oil discoveries. This negative outcome gap 
increases consistently five years after the peak of oil discoveries.  
Democracy in Chad  jumps after the peak (Figure 2.3). However, this is 
because the a civil war started in 1979, two years after the peak, ending in 1982 
(Collins and Burns 2013). The democracy scores of the Republic of Congo (Figure 
2.5) and Sudan (Figure 2.10) are slightly lower than those of their synthetic controls 
corresponding with the peak, but are higher for a short period (five and four years, 
respectively) after the event. Nevertheless, in the long run, the level of democracy 
in both is lower than would have been the case if no peak of oil discoveries had 
occurred. Viet Nam’s democracy score is constant during the post-event period, 
where its counterfactual would have moved towards democracy (Figure 2.12). 
Kazakhstan (Figure 2.8) has a negative outcome gap in the pre-event period, 
increasing two years after the event, albeit with a low magnitude (-0.15 in our 
transformed index).  
For all of those countries, the placebo tests presented in Figure 2.13 confirm 
a significant negative effect of oil discoveries on democracy in the decades 
following the event. In contrast, oil discoveries affect the level of democracy in 
Brazil only in the short run (Figure 2.1).  
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Mexico and Tunisia do not show clear paths. In Mexico, the peak of oil 
discoveries seems to halt the improvement in democracy under way on the eve of 
the event (Figure 2.9). However, as in Tunisia (Figure 2.11), the outcome gap of 
the country is significantly negative. The null hypothesis of no effect cannot be 
rejected in two cases: Colombia (Figure 2.13d) and India (Figure 2.13g). Indeed, 
although for both countries the average effect is negative, their post-event levels of 
democracy do not fall well outside the distribution of placebo effects. Therefore, 
oil discoveries have no significant effect on democracy in India and Colombia. 
Interestingly, these are the only two countries with a high level of democracy in the 
pre-event period (>0.9). 
Finally, one striking case is Gabon (Figure 2.6), the only country in which 
the peak of oil discoveries seems to have a positive effect on democracy. However, 
this is misleading because, after the event under scrutiny, the political institutions 
of the country were impacted by another shock in the form of violent 
demonstrations and strikes in the 1990s, leading to political reforms including the 
transformation of the political system to a multiparty democracy (Collins and Burns 
2013). These events are not captured by the synthetic control, which resembles the 
characteristics of the treated unit only in the absence of further permanent shocks 
in the outcome. 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 are complementary. For each case study, the former sets 
out the average effect of oil discoveries calculated by averaging the distance 
between our transformed indicator of the treated country and the synthetic control 
every 5 years after the peak of oil discoveries. It shows a widespread and often 
sizably lower level of democracy afterwards, in the event of the peak of oil 
discoveries. Gabon is an exception a positive difference for all but one period. 
Mexico has a negative effect in the middle of the period under analysis, which is 
otherwise positive. The negative effect for India is very small and in Brazil it 
declines over time, although it remains negative.  
Table 2.6 reports the average polity2 scores and the value of the 
counterfactual in the same standard 21-point scale. In the absence of the peak of oil 
discovery, Cameroon would have been categorised as a democracy with a polity 
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score of 6 rather than an anocracy (-4 in the Polity dataset).15 The Republic of 
Congo and Sudan show a similar strong difference at the end of the period under 
analysis (7 and 8 points of the polity2 scale, respectively), and would have obtained 
democratic characteristics achieving a score between 5 and 6 in the Polity scale. In 
a similar fashion Viet Nam, which no change in its Polity level, would have 
improved over time, ending up in the democratic group. The pattern of Tunisia 
would have been similar, starting from a lower level, and ending as an anocracy. In 
contrast, Kazakhstan would not have democratised even in the absence of the peak 
of oil discoveries reaching a polity2 score of -3.  
After a drop in democracy level compared to the synthetic control equal to 
10 points in the polity2 scale, Brazil caught up with its counterpart ten years after 
the peak of oil discoveries. This is a nearly unique pattern, similar only to Mexico, 
in which the negative effect is concentrated at the beginning of the period under 
analysis and vanishes over time: in most cases, the negative effect grows as time 
goes by. Colombia and India share another distinctive pattern since they 
consistently score as democracies, however the former deteriorates and the 
difference with the counterfactual grows over time, and the latter has a small U-
shaped pattern in polity2 with a counterfactual with higher value starting from t5. 
Gabon, which stands in Table 2.5 for the positive effect of the oil peak, is still be 
below 0 for most of the post-peak period, but the value of the index would have 
been far more negative. For Chad the peak of oil discoveries would not make much 
difference, worsening the democracy score by a little, ending at most as an open 
anocracy at the end of the period.  
 
[Table 2.5 about here] 
 
                                                          
15 Marshall and Cole (2014: 21) define anocracies as those “countries whose governments are neither 
fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an often incoherent mix of democratic and 
autocratic traits and practices.” The Polity IV Project classifies regimes as follows: autocracy from 
-10 to -6 of the polity score; closed anocracy from -5 to 0; open anocracy from 1 to +5; democracy 
from +6 to +9; full democracy +10. 
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[Table 2.6 about here] 
 
Overall, countries that reached the peak of oil discoveries with a relatively high 
level of democracy tend to be less affected by the decline in democracy itself, 
whereas existing autocratic rule is strengthened. This is in line with some of the 
testable hypotheses derived by Caselli and Tesei (2016). 
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
This section includes a robustness check to test the sensitivity of our main results 
to changes in the measurement of the democracy level. We implement the SCM 
using the Polyarchy dataset compiled by Vanhanen (2014). This dataset provides 
an index of democracy given by the combination of its two most important 
dimensions: the degree of competition (competition) and the degree of participation 
(participation). The former is measured by the smaller parties’ share of votes cast 
in parliamentary or presidential elections, and the latter is measured by the 
percentage of the population which actually voted in these elections. The combined 
index of democracy (democracy) is obtained by multiplying the two indicators and 
dividing the product by 100 (Vanhanen 2000). We estimate the synthetic control 
using these three variables as outcomes. For each indicator, Table 2.7 sets out the 
average effect of oil discoveries calculated every five years after the peak of oil 
discoveries.16  
The trends in outcome gaps show that the results of the previous analysis 
are robust. In particular, the path of democracy gap almost perfectly replicates the 
path given by polity2.17 This is not true for Kazakhstan, whose average effect is 
positive until ten years after the peak of oil discoveries. However, this discrepancy 
could be explained by the fact that the synthetic control does not replicate the 
country in the pre-event period. Indeed, the RMSPE is equal to 2.107 for 
                                                          
16 Graphs and placebo tests are omitted to save space, but are available upon request from the 
authors. 
17 The same cannot be said of participation. However, a low value of the root mean square prediction 
error (RMSPE) was not obtained in most cases, as proven by the difference between the treated units 
and the synthetic controls at t0. 
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democracy. Colombia seems to have a significant, negative outcome gap, but only 
14 years after the event. In addition, in this case, the RMSPE is high. This difference 
vanishes considering participation for which the RMSPE is lower.18 Another 
exception is Mexico for which the effect of oil discoveries is negative and 
significant for both democracy and competition. The negative gap starts to decrease 
five years after the peak. Overall, the peak of oil discoveries, at the very least, 
delayed democratisation in Mexico. 
 
 
[Table 2.7 about here] 
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This paper undertakes a case-study analysis to evaluate the effect of a variation in 
oil endowment on political regimes. We used the SCM to estimate the democracy 
level that would have occurred in the absence of the event. This approach 
overcomes the weaknesses of previous analyses, solving the problems of 
endogeneity. In particular, the choice of concentrating on oil wealth and not oil 
production makes the shock reasonably exogenous. 
Overall, this paper confirms the idea that natural resources may be a curse 
or a blessing for a country, depending on the quality of its institutions (Mehlum et 
al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006). In particular, the relationship between natural 
resources and democracy shows some non-linearities depending on the initial level 
of democracy itself. Indeed, only the democracy levels of India and Colombia, with 
democracy scores above 0.9 (8 in the original polity2), do not change significantly 
after the peak of oil discoveries. All other countries, with the exception of Gabon 
where a period of political reforms took place after the peak of oil discoveries, were 
negatively affected by the variation in oil endowment. This effect is sizable, with, 
on average, the counterfactual level of democracy in those countries 3 points higher 
on the 21-item scale of polity2 without the peak of oil discoveries.  
                                                          
18 RMSPE is 1.001 for democracy, 5.287 for competition, and 0.395 for participation. 
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A plausible explanation of these results is that, as the rate of discoveries 
starts to decline, incumbents enforce higher entry barriers to retain the remaining 
resources. This is prevented in democracies with higher levels of executive 
constraints.  
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Table 2.1 - Case studies 
Country Peak of oil discoveries Start year synth 
Brazil 1975 1965 
Cameroon 1977 1967 
Chad 1977 1967 
Colombia 1992 1982 
Republic of Congo 1984 1974 
Gabon 1985 1975 
India 1974 1964 
Kazakhstan 2000 1991 
Malaysia 1973 1963 
Mexico 1977 1967 
Pakistan 1983 1973 
Sudan  1980 1970 
Thailand  1981 1971 
Tunisia 1971 1961 
Viet Nam 1975 1965 
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Table 2.2 - Variable definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Source Mean SD Min. Max. 
Democracy Transformed revised combined Polity IV score 
(Polity2) ranging from 0 (hereditary monarchy) to 1 
(consolidated democracy) 
Polity IV Project, Center for 
Systemic Peace (Marshall et al. 
2014) 
0. 560 0.359 0 1 
Gdp  Log RGDPe per capita (at chained purchasing power 
parity in million, 2005 USD prices) 
Penn World Table 8.1 (Feenstra 
et al. 2015) 
8. 055 1.160 5.219 11.325 
Human capital Index of human capital per person, based on years of 
schooling (Barro and Lee 2013) and returns to 
education (Psacharopoulos 1994) 
Penn World Table 8.1 (Feenstra 
et al. 2015) 
2.007 0.627 1.018 3.535 
Total rents Total natural resources rents (percentage of GDP) World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2015) 
6.637 10.277 0 83.432 
Mining Value added by sectors of economic activity, 
annual, 1970–2013: mining and utilities (percentage 
of GDP) 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
6.607 8.547 0 72.123 
Manufacturing Value added by sectors of economic activity, 
annual, 1970–2013: manufacturing (percentage of 
GDP) 
UNCTAD 15.666 7.534 0.032 50.180 
Primary Value added by kind of economic activity, annual, 
1970–2013: agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 
(percentage of GDP) 
UNCTAD 21.050 15.869 0.034 80.510 
Openness Sum of import and exports over GDP (at constant 
national 2005 prices) 
Penn World Table 8.1  
(Feenstra et al. 2015) 
0.691 0.482 0.039 4.605 
Hostility  Hostility level of interstate dispute ranging from 0 
(no dispute) to 5 (war) 
Palmer et al. (2015) 0.853 1.591 0 5 
                         Note: SD, standard deviation; min., minimum; max., maximum; GDP, gross domestic product.
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Table 2.3 - Peak of oil discovery and democracy predictors in 1970 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Gdp  -0.030  
(0.033) 
       0.067  
(0.085) 
Human capital  -0.150***  
(0.056) 
      -0.344**  
(0.149) 
Total rents   0.001  
(0.006) 
     -0.004  
(0.006) 
Mining    0.000 
(0.006) 
    -0.000  
(0.008) 
Manufacturing     -0.002  
(0.003) 
   -0.000  
(0.006) 
Primary      0.000  
(0.002) 
  -0.003 
 (0.004) 
Openness       -0.153* 
 (0.078) 
 -0.134 
 (0.101) 
Hostility         0.030  
(0.027) 
0.032  
(0.032) 
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the country has reached the peak of oil discoveries since 1970, and 0 otherwise.  
Covariates are measured in 1970. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.10. 
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Table 2.4 - Predictor balance and root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) 
Predictor Case study 
 Brazil  Synthetic Brazil 
Gdp  8.049063 8.494432 
Human capital 1.423229 1.592064 
Total rents  3.032327 2.624917 
Mining  2.817145 4.866887 
Manufacturing  29.25174 19.27867 
Primary  11.87682 25.98486 
Openness 0.1084437 0.27975 
Hostility  0.4 3.0722 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.075 0.07599 
RMSPE  0.001012 
   
 Cameroon  Synthetic Cameroon 
Gdp  7.177065 7.141711 
Human capital 1.311305 1.384907 
Total rents  4.055883 6.277098 
Mining  1.17727 1.180156 
Manufacturing  14.70772 11.03428 
Primary  28.28982 44.37049 
Openness 0.2701598 0.2741007 
Hostility  0.4 0.406 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.125 0.12755 
RMSPE  0.0075677 
   
 Chad Synthetic Chad 
Gdp  7.265192 7.25084 
Total rents 4.75743 4.746761 
Mining  0.9221356 0.921185 
Manufacturing  12.31258 12.28897 
Primary  41.9175 41.82736 
Openness 0.498415 0.4972167 
Hostility  0.2 0.1984 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.07 0.07283 
RMSPE  0.0336496 
   
 Colombia  Synthetic Colombia 
Gdp  8.731305 9.189705 
Human capital 2.016568 2.145918 
Total rents 6.595242 1.345631 
Mining 6.283752 4.958925 
Manufacturing 18.12654 21.17535 
Primary 12.55478 7.596763 
Openness 0.2025784 0.2305646 
Hostility  1.2 1.2468 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.905 0.904515 
RMSPE  0.0011125 
   
 Republic of Congo Synthetic Republic of Congo 
Gdp  7.536801 7.582842 
Human capital 1.667621 1.458849 
Total rents 39.64646 21.13613 
Mining 28.3415 19.28067 
Manufacturing 9.006013 9.808753 
Primary 13.46419 16.33363 
Openness 1.111467 1.124935 
Hostility  0.5 0.4995 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.125 0.12557 
RMSPE  0.0149957 
   
Continued on next page 
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… table 2.4 continued 
Predictor Case study 
 Gabon  Synthetic Gabon 
Gdp  9.252937 7.839756 
Human capital 1.59167 1.627161 
Total rents 47.64735 12.65417 
Mining 41.641 6.981598 
Manufacturing 6.07867 15.45709 
Primary 5.053038 27.86907 
Openness 1.016262 1.320546 
Hostility  0.1 0.1008 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.05  0.0508 
RMSPE  0.00063 
   
 India Synthetic India 
Gdp  7.055507 8.774614 
Human capital 1.223596 2.135507 
Total rents  2.316797 2.268751 
Mining  2.117753 2.168657 
Manufacturing  14.2285 26.663 
Primary  42.94529 13.29678 
Openness 0.1135095 0.2515587 
Hostility  4 0.3451 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.95 0.94994 
RMSPE  0.0005722 
   
 Kazakhstan  Synthetic Kazakhstan 
Gdp  8.751681 8.707081 
Human capital 2.708643 2.067864 
Total rents 17.93863 9.386802 
Mining 12.41103 2.115997 
Manufacturing 11.92521 16.18919 
Primary 13.41587 21.08155 
Openness 1.21744 1.947997 
Hostility  0.7777778 0.1145556 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.3222222 0.32225 
RMSPE  0.0248456 
   
Predictor Malaysia  Synthetic Malaysia 
Gdp  7.909242 7.99283 
Human capital 1.655252 1.69775 
Total rents 6.420214 6.41138 
Mining  9.681566 9.961237 
Manufacturing  14.61374 14.594 
Primary  28.48076 15.85045 
Openness 0.6859536 0.5896284 
Hostility  1.5 0.8885 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.85 0.834385 
RMSPE  0.1645738 
   
 Mexico  Synthetic Mexico 
Gdp  8.904852 8.059699 
Human capital 1.65393 1.987598 
Total rents  3.48081 3.472643 
Mining  8.50995 8.469963 
Manufacturing  19.22363 22.49874 
Primary  10.6091 23.63679 
Openness  0.1206917 0.2188393 
Hostility  0 0.5021 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.2 0.1995 
RMSPE  0.0001902 
   
Continued on next page 
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… table 2.4 continued 
Predictor Case study 
 Pakistan  Synthetic Pakistan 
Gdp  7.341958 7.060531 
Human capital 1.3101 1.353643 
Total rents 4.194234 1.987898 
Mining 4.095575 4.535334 
Manufacturing 10.42744 9.951427 
Primary 34.40184 33.75569 
Openness 0.3474532 0.3627543 
Hostility  2.1 2.0756 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.45 0.442475 
RMSPE  0.3453261 
   
 Sudan  Synthetic Sudan 
Gdp  7.152358 7.239045 
Human capital 1.137935 1.476076 
Total rents 0.0002809 2.006756 
Mining 1.892794 2.165256 
Manufacturing 8.861436 10.98123 
Primary 38.16304 38.15145 
Openness 0.1021655 0.4820521 
Hostility  1.5 1.5302 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.175 0.17774 
RMSPE  0.046698 
   
 Thailand  Synthetic Thailand 
Gdp  7.784089 8.283527 
Human capital 1.70597 1.761231 
Total rents 2.306225 2.597524 
Mining 2.669549 6.407429 
Manufacturing 19.71048 18.29137 
Primary 25.37276 15.79119 
Openness 0.4776597 0.4599142 
Hostility  3.9 3.4765 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.435 0.43146 
RMSPE  0.1992042 
   
 Tunisia  Synthetic Tunisia 
Gdp  7.418731 7.490103 
Human capital 1.199441 1.417062 
Total rents 3.160351 3.295567 
Mining 5.51892 1.988342 
Manufacturing 8.745414 10.55169 
Primary 15.21589 28.22424 
Openness 0.6536856 0.4287062 
Hostility  0.7 2.2609 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.055 0.056595 
RMSPE  0.0142813 
   
 Viet Nam  Synthetic Viet Nam 
Gdp  6.545513 7.523913 
Human capital 1.739625 1.747607 
Total rents 0 1.698035 
Mining 3.951625 5.941236 
Manufacturing 16.07247 15.72458 
Primary 42.62852 34.60567 
Openness 0.6227122 0.5732201 
Hostility  5 1.3198 
Average pre-discovery democracy 0.13 0.135505 
RMSPE  0.024323 
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Table 2.5 - Average effect of the peak of oil discoveries on the transformed 
polity2 indicator 
Country t0 t5 t10 t15 t20 t25 t30 
Brazil  -0.251 -0.501 -0.394 0.036 -0.003 -0.018 -0.028 
Cameroon  -0.003 -0.047 -0.159 -0.388 -0.431 -0.412 -0.354 
Chad  0.061 0.369 0.133 -0.125 -0.228 -0.177 -0.239 
Colombia 0.000 -0.060 -0.099 -0.104 -0.113 -0.113 — 
Republic of Congo -0.050 -0.062 0.076 -0.068 -0.256 -0.394 -0.403 
Gabon  -0.001 0.029 0.212 0.199 0.196 0.265 0.482 
India  0.001 -0.069 -0.063 -0.067 -0.086 -0.036 -0.020 
Kazakhstan  -0.022 -0.111 -0.151 -0.151 — — — 
Mexico  0.151 0.136 0.095 -0.108 -0.128 0.046 0.092 
Sudan  -0.047 -0.083 -0.090 -0.163 -0.607 -0.634 -0.659 
Tunisia  -0.005 0.029 0.224 -0.495 -0.554 -0.506 -0.395 
Viet Nam  -0.015 0.000 0.002 -0.045 -0.087 -0.280 -0.267 
Note: Dashes (—) indicate no estimation is available. 
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Table 2.6 - Average level of polity2 and counterfactual scores after the peak of oil 
discoveries 
Country t0 t5 t10 t15 t20 t25 t30 
Brazil  -4 -4 -1.2 7.6 8 8 8 
Syntethic Brazil 1.016 6.0172 6.6844 6.8816 8.0624 8.354 8.5648 
Cameroon  -8 -7.8 -8 -7.2 -4 -4 -4 
Syntethic Cameroon -7.932 -6.8506 -4.8154 0.558 4.619 5.062 3.0846 
Chad  -7 -0.6 -5 -6 -3.2 -2 -2 
Syntethic Chad -8.21 -7.9842 -7.6558 -3.4996 1.3578 1.69725 2.777 
Colombia  9 7.8 7 7 7 7 — 
Syntethic Colombia 9.001 8.9942 8.9744 9.0886 9.261 9.261 — 
Republic of Congo -8 -8 1.2 -1.6 -4.6 -4 -4 
Syntethic Congo -6.993 -6.765 -0.3294 -0.25 0.5118 3.84325 4.051 
Gabon  -9 -8.4 -4 -4 -4 -2.25 3 
Syntethic Gabon -8.984 -8.984 -8.2496 -7.984 -7.9168 -6.472 -6.64 
India 9 7.6 8 8 8 9 9 
Syntethic India 8.978 8.976 9.2616 9.333 9.714 9.7125 9.4002 
Kazakhstan  -4 -5.6 -6 -6 — — — 
Syntethic Kazakhstan -3.555 -3.384 -2.985 -2.985 — — — 
Mexico  -3 -3 -3 0 3.6 7 8 
Syntethic Mexico -6.01 -5.7264 -4.902 2.1622 6.158 6.4925 6.1524 
Sudan -7 -5.6 1.4 -7 -7 -6.25 -3.6 
Syntethic Sudan -6.901 -6.185 -3.0838 2.8988 4.088 4.29975 4.2952 
Tunisia -9 -9 -8.8 -8 -5 -3.5 -3 
Syntethic Tunisia -8.708 -8.999 -8.8332 -7.103 -3.268 2.189 2.3324 
Viet Nam -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
Syntethic Viet Nam -6.062 -5.348 -5.1956 -3.735 5.142 5.70025 6.1836 
Note: Dashes (—) indicate no estimation is available. 
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Table 2.7 - Average effect of the peak of oil discoveries on Vanhanen’s 
democracy indicators 
Country indicator t0 t5 t10 t15 t20 t25 t30 
Brazil        
Democracy 0.000 -13.411 -14.853 -5.648 0.372 0.733 5.229 
Competition 0.000 -3.078 9.581 10.624 9.703 12.685 14.509 
Participation -0.981 -1.844 -26.276 -12.368 12.092 14.725 22.829 
Cameroon         
Democracy -3.845 -6.663 -6.940 -6.650 -2.884 -12.007 -8.878 
Competition -1.347 -1.085 -8.257 -3.058 1.598 -34.089 -4.605 
Participation 0.208 7.971 7.513 2.398 2.122 -3.600 -3.104 
Chad         
Democracy -5.461 -5.143 -4.765 -6.730 -10.362 -3.604 -2.873 
Competition -6.767 -6.489 -5.470 -21.258 -33.352 -3.709 10.240 
Participation -26.900 -25.384 -28.366 -27.397 -5.514 10.169 3.514 
Colombia         
Democracy -1.562 -4.373 0.414 -4.502 -7.993 — — 
Competition 1.693 1.306 0.260 -7.927 -19.607 — — 
Participation -2.266 -11.189 -2.618 -8.047 -8.668 — — 
Republic of Congo         
Democracy 0.000 -2.927 10.520 3.802 0.242 -6.790 -9.382 
Competition 0.000 -14.193 28.280 9.802 -1.358 -26.439 -37.315 
Participation -0.421 -0.496 17.558 -21.666 -1.117 13.766 -0.909 
Gabon         
Democracy -3.091 0.206 9.740 4.961 3.946 -4.843 -17.275 
Competition -3.280 2.446 37.020 26.051 23.792 0.731 -41.767 
Participation 0.010 0.146 -1.362 -22.330 -11.963 -16.832 -25.646 
India         
Democracy -0.372 1.414 -0.171 -2.194 -4.754 -1.683 -4.023 
Competition 3.114 4.609 1.768 -5.548 -4.287 1.367 -9.207 
Participation 13.752 21.004 1.641 -4.640 6.472 11.376 12.496 
Kazakhstan        
Democracy 4.658 3.418 -3.171 — — — — 
Competition 6.939 5.990 -10.113 — — — — 
Participation 1.511 -0.753 -3.049 — — — — 
Mexico         
Democracy -19.508 -17.357 -11.245 -9.097 -6.149 -2.477 -2.231 
Competition -42.796 -38.662 -16.475 0.906 -0.624 5.809 10.322 
Participation -9.974 -5.826 -3.693 -12.637 3.498 1.506 -0.699 
Sudan         
Democracy -0.001 -12.316 -14.038 -13.647 -10.430 -14.149 -6.990 
Competition 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.800 7.240 
Participation 1.144 2.190 0.509 -0.236 2.552 3.341 10.366 
Tunisia        
Democracy 0.012 -0.190 1.121 -4.676 -0.679 -2.124 -13.120 
Competition -0.189 -0.593 13.474 -29.157 -9.099 -15.596 -25.757 
Participation 0.110 -12.028 -31.423 -42.859 -20.544 -23.541 -44.198 
Viet Nam        
Democracy 0.012 -0.190 1.121 -4.676 -0.679 -2.124 -13.120 
Competition -0.189 -0.593 13.474 -29.157 -9.099 -15.596 -25.757 
Participation 0.110 -12.028 -31.423 -42.859 -20.544 -23.541 -44.198 
Note: Dashes (—) indicate no estimation is available. 
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Figure 2.1 - Path of democracy: (a) Brazil versus synthetic control (b) outcome 
gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.2 - Path of democracy: (a) Cameroon versus synthetic control; (b) 
outcome gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.3 - Path of democracy: (a) Chad versus synthetic control; (b) outcome 
gap 
(a)  
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.4 - Path of democracy: (a) Colombia versus synthetic control; (b) 
outcome gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.5 - Path of democracy: (a) Republic of Congo versus synthetic control; 
(b) outcome gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.6 - Path of democracy: (a) Gabon versus synthetic control; (b) outcome 
gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.7 - Path of democracy: (a) India versus synthetic control; (b) outcome 
gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.8 - Path of democracy: (a) Kazakhstan versus synthetic control; (b) 
outcome gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.9 - Path of democracy: (a) Mexico versus synthetic control; (b) outcome 
gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
99 
 
Figure 2.10 - Path of democracy: (a) Sudan versus synthetic control; (b) outcome 
gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.11 - Path of democracy: (a) Tunisia versus synthetic control; (b) outcome 
gap 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.12 - Path of democracy: (a) Viet Nam versus synthetic control; (b) 
outcome gap 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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Figure 2.13 - (a)–(l) Placebo tests 
(a) Brazil 
  
 
(b) Cameroon 
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(c) Chad 
 
 
(d) Colombia 
 
104 
 
(e) Republic of Congo 
 
 
(f) Gabon 
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(g) India 
 
 
(h) Kazakhstan 
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(i) Mexico 
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(k) Tunisia 
 
 
(l) Viet Nam 
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Appendix 
Table 2.A.1 - Discoveries excluded from the case studies 
Country Peak of oil discoveries  Country Peak of oil 
discoveries 
Albania 1928  Italy 1981 
Algeria 1956  Kuwait 1938 
Angola 1971  Libya 1961 
Argentina 1960  Nigeria 1967 
Australia 1967  Oman 1962 
Austria 1947  Peru 1861 
Azerbaijan 1871  Qatar 1940 
Bahrain 1932  Romania 1857 
Bolivia 1966  Russia 1960 
Canada 1958  Saudi Arabia  1948 
Chile 1960  Syria 1966 
China 1959  Trinidad 1959 
Croatia 1950  Turkey 1969 
Ecuador 1969  Turkmenistan 1964 
Egypt 1965  Ukraine 1962 
France 1958  United Arab Emirates 1980 
Germany 1952  United States 1930 
Hungary 1964  Uzbekistan 1992 
Indonesia 1945  Venezuela 1941 
Iran 1961  Yemen 1978 
Source: Campbell (2006). 
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Table 2.A.2 - Country weights in the synthetic control and potential controls 
Brazil 
Synthetic control Central African Republic (0.01), Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.153), 
Morocco (0.004), Portugal (0.833) 
Potential controls Belgium, Bulgaria, Burundi, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, 
Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia 
Cameroon 
Synthetic control Benin (0.075), Nepal (0.368), Niger (0.049), Paraguay (0.301), Tanzania (0.156), 
Uruguay (0.051) 
Potential controls Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Zambia 
Chad 
Synthetic control Bhutan (0.286), Ethiopia (0.007), Honduras (0.027), Malawi (0.169), Nepal 
(0.052), Paraguay (0.434), Portugal (0.023) 
Potential controls Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Philippines, Poland, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Uruguay, Zambia 
Colombia 
Synthetic control Nepal (0.007), Spain (0.884), Tanzania (0.048), Zambia (0.061) 
Potential controls Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri 
Lanka, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Benin, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of 
Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, New Zealand, 
Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Zimbabwe 
Republic of Congo 
Synthetic control Jordan (0.228), Liberia (0.669), Zambia (0.103) 
Potential controls Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri 
Lanka, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tanzania, Uruguay, Zimbabwe 
Gabon 
Synthetic control Mauritania (0.336), Singapore (0.001), Swaziland (0.664) 
Potential controls Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri 
Lanka, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia 
Continued on next page 
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… table 2.A.2 continued 
India 
Synthetic control Costa Rica (0.429), Japan (0.517), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (0.001), 
Nepal (0.051), Zambia (0.002) 
Potential controls Belgium, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Republic of Korea, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tanzania, 
Uruguay 
Kazakhstan 
Synthetic control Lao People’s Democratic Republic (0.349), Liberia (0.095), Singapore (0.556) 
Potential controls Bangladesh, Armenia, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Central 
African Republic, Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Benin, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Moldova, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Mexico 
Synthetic control Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.067), Japan (0.083), Nepal (0.142), Poland 
(0.57), Togo (0.137) 
Potential controls Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of 
Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia 
Sudan 
Synthetic control Greece (0.014), Jordan (0.126), Mali (0.385), Tanzania (0.267), Uruguay (0.208) 
Potential controls Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Tunisia 
Synthetic control Jordan (0.485), Mongolia (0.034), Nepal (0.257), Paraguay (0.224) 
Potential controls Belgium, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Republic of Korea, Lao, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tanzania, Uruguay 
Viet Nam 
Synthetic control Bulgaria (0.355), Jordan (0.143), Malawi (0.035), Mali (0.297), Portugal (0.119), 
Singapore (0.05) 
Potential controls Belgium, Burundi, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Benin, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, 
Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, 
Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia 
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3. Is there a fiscal resource curse? 
The mitigation effect of political institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While several studies have focused on the effect of natural resources on economic 
development, less attention has been paid to their effects on other development outcomes. 
We contribute to this literature by studying the impact of resource rents on tax systems. We 
posit that natural resource rents reduce the incentives to invest in fiscal capacity, which is 
the ability to raise revenues from broad tax bases. However, political institutions that limit 
the power of the executive may mitigate or neutralise the negative effect of natural 
resources on fiscal infrastructures. We provide empirical support to this hypothesis using 
panel data covering the period 1981-2011 and 100 developing countries. Moreover, we 
show that the effect of natural resources is likely to work through fiscal institutions that 
make the state accountable to, and transparent for, its citizens. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The effect of natural resource abundance on the economy has been a lively area of 
research for many years. Traditionally, most research has concentrated on long-
term growth effects, initially finding a “resource curse”, and more recently arguing 
that the long-term effect of specialising in natural resources depends on the type of 
resources (e.g., Isham et al. 2005) and the quality of the institutional environment 
in the economy (e.g., Mehlum et al. 2006)1. As yet, less analysis has been devoted 
to other development outcomes. For example, underexplored areas include the 
effects on inequality (Carmignani 2013; Goderis and Malone 2011; Fum and Hodler 
2010), education (Ebeke et al 2015; Stijns 2006), health and living standards 
(Edwards 2016; Pineda and Rodriguez 2010; Caselli and Michaels 2013). This 
paper contributes to the literature by looking at a further underexplored issue: the 
effects of natural resource abundance on the state and, in particular, fiscal capacity2. 
We provide a systematic econometric analysis of the effect of resource abundance 
on fiscal systems, arguing that it appears to depend on the quality of political 
institutions.  
Our hypothesis is that natural resource rents reduce the incentives to invest in 
fiscal capacity, but political institutions limiting the power of the executive and 
                                                          
1 Many studies have addressed the counter-intuitive idea that countries that are highly endowed in 
exploitable natural resources perform worse than those without. Much of the early literature argues 
the adverse effect of natural resource wealth on economic growth (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995, 
1999, 2001; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Gylfason, 2001). See van der Ploeg (2011) for a 
comprehensive survey of the hypotheses and evidence. Alongside the focus on growth, the literature 
has also shown that natural resources abundance leads to higher level of corruption (e.g., Caselli and 
Michaels, 2013), civil conflicts (e.g., Collier and Hoeffer, 2004), and less democracy (e.g. Ross, 
2001). The negative effects of natural resources are, however, controversial. For example, Alexeev 
and Conrad (2009) claim that a large endowment of oil and mineral resources has a positive effect 
on long-term economic growth and does not negatively impact on the quality of institutions. Cotet 
and Tsui (2013) contradict the statistical association between the value of oil reserves and the onset 
of civil war, and Haber and Menaldo (2011) find that increasing resource reliance does not promote 
dictatorship over the long run. Finally, Stijns (2006) denies the negative correlation between 
resource abundance and human capital. 
2 Following Besley and Persson (2011), we consider fiscal capacity  the ability of a fiscal system to 
raise revenues from a broad tax base.  
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hence promoting accountability and common interests, may mitigate or neutralise 
the negative effect of natural resources on fiscal infrastructures. To test this 
hypothesis, we use panel methods on a sample of 100 developing countries, from 
1981 to 2011. Our fiscal capacity measure, the share of non-resource taxes on 
income, profits, and capital gains on non-resource total taxes, is based on the 
assumption that collecting income taxes requires a more developed and competent 
administrative structure than raising other types of taxes (see Besley and Persson 
2014) and is constructed using the Government Revenues Dataset (GRD) (Prichard 
et al., 2014), with improved coverage and the distinction between resource and non-
resource revenues. We find persuasive evidence that the impact of resource income, 
after extensive robustness checks, depends on whether political institutions place 
significant constraints on executive power. Hence, a fiscal resource curse does not 
necessarily materialise in resource-rich economies.  These results are 
complemented with further analysis to assess how mitigation of political 
institutions impacts on specific aspects of tax systems. Using a recent set of 
indicators provided by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability project 
(PEFA, 2006), we provide initial evidence suggesting that the effect of natural 
resources is likely to work through fiscal institutions that make the state accountable 
to, and transparent for, its citizens. 
In addition to contributing to the literature on the resource curse, our paper 
adds to the research on the determinants of state capacity, an area which has as yet 
seen relatively little empirical analysis (Savoia and Sen 2015), despite now being 
considered strategically important for economic development (Besley and Persson 
2011). Indeed, the capacity to collect revenue is indispensable for the provision of 
public goods and investments in infrastructure, as stylised facts suggest that 
developing economies collect, on average, a significantly smaller share of taxes 
compared to advanced market economies (Besley and Persson 2014). Hence, 
assessing whether a geographical feature shaping the structure of the economy, such 
as natural resource abundance, comes with the likely price of underdeveloped fiscal 
institutions may have relevant policy trade-offs. We find that this is not the case, if 
countries have suitable political institutions.  
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and sets 
out our hypotheses; Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data. In section 
4, we test our hypotheses and identify the specific channels through which natural 
resources affect the fiscal system. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Resource curse, fiscal capacity and political institutions 
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that natural resource abundance may 
be harmful to tax systems, as governments tend to substitute tax revenues with 
resource revenues. Part of the literature has discussed this effect with respect to the 
short-term macroeconomic consequences for taxation, in terms of the amount and 
composition of tax revenues, as well as spending. According to James (2015), a 
benevolent government decreases non-resource tax rates and increases spending 
and savings in response to higher resource revenues. This idea is supported by US-
state level data: a $1 increase in resource revenue results in a $0.25 decrease in non-
resource revenue, a $0.43 increase in government spending and a $0.32 increase in 
public savings. Morrison (2009) finds that an increase in non-tax revenue is 
associated with reduced taxation on elites in democracies and more social spending 
in dictatorships. Focussing on the consequences for tax composition in resource-
rich economies, Crivelli and Gupta (2014) estimate whether there is a differential 
effect of resource revenue on different components of non-resource taxation, and 
find a large negative impact of resource revenues on the taxation of goods and 
services, and a more modest impact on corporate income tax and trade taxes. 
Looking at tax performance, Morrissey et al. (2016) find that a reliance on natural 
resources amplifies the negative effects of macroeconomic shocks (terms of trade, 
exchange rates and natural disasters) on total revenues.  Interestingly, they also find 
that democracies tend to outperform non-democracies in revenue resilience to 
shocks in lower income countries.  
Less attention has been paid to the long-term consequences, i.e. the effect of 
natural resources on tax system building. In this case, unlike the benevolent 
government framework, the negative effect of resource rents on taxation can be 
explained considering the incentives for investing in the tax system. Tax revenues 
can be used by the government to provide public goods and services and thereby 
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increase political support. In this contest, windfall revenues shift the marginal 
benefits from tax revenues, leading to a lower level of tax revenues and a lower-
quality tax system (Knack, 2009). The capacity to raise taxes can also be modelled 
as forward looking investments under uncertainty (Besley and Persson, 2010, 
2011). According to the recent literature on state capacity, the government can 
choose the level of redistributive transfers and public goods provision, but the level 
of taxation required to implement these policies is constrained by fiscal 
infrastructures. Incumbents have the opportunity to invest in increased fiscal 
capacity, but their incentives for building an efficient fiscal apparatus depends on 
political and economic factors such as the level of income,  war, political stability 
and conflict within the country. Jensen (2010) extends this framework to 
considering how natural resources affect investments in fiscal capacity, arguing that 
when a shock renders the economy more resource dependent, investment is 
discouraged due to the smaller tax base. The ensuing cross-section evidence is 
consistent with this hypothesis: a 1% increase in resource intensity causes a 1.4% 
decrease in fiscal capacity. 
Although there is agreement on the negative effect of natural resources on 
fiscal capacity, the actual empirical evidence is fairly limited, often fraught with 
methodological challenges, and in need of systematic investigation. Moreover, 
existing studies do not consider a crucial aspect at the heart of our analysis: the 
interplay between natural resources and institutions. An increasing number of 
papers argues, and empirically demonstrates, that institutions can mitigate or even 
reverse the resource curse (e.g., Melhum et al., 2006; Brunnschweiler, 2008; 
Boschini et al., 2007; El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 
2010, 2014; Ebeke et al., 2015; Omgba, 2015).3 Two explanations have been put 
forward to understand the role of institutions: the “rent-seeking model” (Tornell 
and Lane, 1999; Torvik, 2002; Melhum et al., 2006) and the “patronage model” 
                                                          
3 Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) argue that what matters in reducing negative effects on growth is 
the constitutional arrangement: presidential regimes and proportional electoral systems are more 
likely to be afflicted by the resource curse. The detrimental effect of natural resources may also be 
reversed by high human capital endowments (Kurtz and Brooks, 2011), while public spending could 
mitigate civil conflicts related to oil wealth (Bodea et al. 2016). 
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(Robinson et al, 2006; Caselli and Cunningham, 2009).4 According to the former, 
the economic institutions governing the private sector are what matter. Resource 
rents change the preferences of private individuals so they switch from productive 
to unproductive activities. Thus, natural resources hinder economic growth only if 
the quality of institutions that govern the profitability of productive enterprise is 
such that incentivises rent seeking. For example, Melhum et al., 2006 argue that the 
combination of resource abundance and “grabber friendly” institutions is 
detrimental for economic development, while “producer friendly” institutions help 
countries take full advantage of their natural resource endowments. On the contrary, 
the “patronage model” focuses on the institutions governing the use of public sector 
resources. Resource booms increase the value of incumbency and provide 
politicians with more funds which can be used to influence the outcome of elections, 
thereby increasing resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. However, 
institutions that promote accountability and state competence discourage the 
perverse political incentives that such a boom creates. 
Perverse effects from rent seeking and patronage are not mutually exclusive 
but can operate together. But is there an institutional environment where an 
economy can have both private sector and state institutions that avert rent-seeking 
and patronage mechanisms? This is where political institutions that place effective 
constraints on a ruler can play a major role. Such political systems promote 
contracting and property rights institutions, fostering production activities, so that 
a large cross-section of society can take advantage of economic opportunities 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005). At the same time, limits on executive 
power promote a “common interest” environment, in which the ruling minority is 
unable to hand out favours to cronies or themselves (Besley and Persson 2011). In 
this paper, focussing on these kinds of political institution,  we assess if natural 
resources affect fiscal capacity and if a higher level of checks and balances on 
executive power can mitigate this effect. Subject to checks and balances, a ruler in 
a resource-rich economy may be more likely to promote an effective independent 
                                                          
4 Caselli and Cunningham (2009) define the underlying mechanisms of these models as 
decentralised and centralised, respectively. Other mechanisms (soft budget constraint and wealth 
effect) are considered of secondary importance.  
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civil service (rather than one based on patronage) and to follow the rule of law, so 
that the judicial system may counter rent seeking more effectively. Figure 1 
suggests that a fiscal resource curse does exist: countries with a high level of total 
natural resource rents collect a low level of taxes as a percentage of GDP. However, 
splitting the sample into high- and low-level executive constraints (right-hand 
scatter plot), the effect of resource rents on taxation can be significantly different.5 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The role of natural resource abundance and the mitigating effect that political 
institutions play in developing fiscal capacity can be restated via two testable 
hypotheses: 
i. Resource rents reduce the incentives to invest in fiscal capacity, so 
resource-rich countries have less developed tax systems (collect a 
lower share of income tax in total taxes).    
ii. Political institutions placing limits on the executive powers promote 
common interests and raise the incentives for investing in fiscal 
capacity. The negative effect of natural resources on fiscal 
infrastructure is therefore mitigated or neutralised in countries with 
a higher level of executive constraints.  
The following sections  look at how natural resources affect the incentives for 
building an efficient fiscal apparatus, using different measures of fiscal capacity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Taxes are defined as the non-resource component of total tax revenues excluding social 
contributions. Data are averaged from 2000 to 2011, while total natural resource rents are averaged 
between 1970 and 1999. The sample is split, considering the median value of executive constraints. 
Variables and sources are described in Table A1 in the Appendix. The apparently heterogeneous 
effect of natural resource rents is confirmed even when a possible outlier such as Lesotho is excluded 
from the sample (Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
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3.3 Empirical strategy and data 
The previous section suggests that there may be a non-linear relationship between 
resource income and fiscal capacity, depending on the type of political institutions. 
In principle, there are two possible approaches to estimate this relationship.  
The first estimates the relationship under investigation using cross-country 
data in levels, since the types of mechanism we seek to document look at the 
structural conditions under which countries develop capable states, and are, 
therefore, long-term in nature. In this case, regressions based on cross-section 
averages, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, are suitable. However, there are at least two 
problems with this approach. The first is the vulnerability to omitted variable bias, 
as there may be several hard-to-capture factors correlated with both the volume of 
resource rents and state capacity. The second is that shaping the structure of the 
economy, including its degree of reliance on natural resources, is a process driven 
by a variety of social forces, including state institutions. Hence, the estimated effect 
of natural resource reliance could be affected by reverse causality and be subject to 
bias.   
The second approach relies on assessing if the type of relationship 
documented in figures 1 and 2 disappears when looking at the effect of changes in 
resource income on fiscal capacity. If it does not, we are probably capturing a causal 
effect. This approach involves the use of panel methods, conditional at the initial 
level on political institutions. In particular, looking at the effect of changes in 
resource income on fiscal capacity eliminates confounding time-invariant country-
specific factors. That is, fixed effects can be added to take care of country-specific 
factors affecting both resource income and fiscal capacity, while time effects can 
be added to control for global trends.  
We use the panel approach, coupled with the choice of a resource income 
variable allowing clean identification of its effect. We also use resource rent data 
as a share of national income provided by the World Bank.6 Such variables are 
                                                          
6 See World Development Indicators, available at: http://databank.worldbank.org. Resource rent 
estimation is based on sources and methods fully described by the World Bank (2011) i.e. on the 
difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of producing it, estimating the 
world price of units of specific commodities and subtracting estimates of average unit costs of 
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based on commodity prices. Assuming that both the identity of a country’s 
commodities and world prices are largely exogenous to state institutions, this 
measure avoids identification problems related to the estimation of the effects of 
natural resources (this approach was first used by Caselli and Tesei, 2016). This 
assumption can be tested, albeit indirectly. We investigate whether it holds by 
excluding from the sample large commodity producing countries able to influence 
world prices.  
Our specification is the following:  
 
FCt = b0 + b1RRit-4-bar + b2ECit-4 + b3RRit-4-bar* ECit-4 + bXit + μi + λt + uit 
 
FCt is fiscal capacity at time t. Our measure of fiscal capacity is given by the ratio 
between non-resource taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and total non-
resource tax revenues. Contrary to previous proxies of fiscal capacity, often based 
on the amount of total taxes as a percentage of GDP, ours distinguishes the capacity 
to raise taxes from the government’s policy choices. Indeed, collecting income 
taxes requires major investments in fiscal infrastructures compared to other types 
of taxes (Besley and Persson, 2011: 41-42). Data was taken from the Government 
Revenues Dataset (GRD) developed at the International Centre for Tax and 
Development (Prichard et al., 2014). This dataset combines data from several 
international databases, with marked improvements in data coverage. Crucially, it 
also allows tax revenue to be distinguished from natural resource and non-resource 
sources, improving the accuracy of measurement.7  
RRt-4-bar is the resource rent, as described above, averaged over t-4 to t-1 (with 
a non-overlapping structure), allowing for possible lags in the reaction of fiscal 
                                                          
extraction or harvesting costs (including a normal return on capital). The unit rents are then 
multiplied by the quantities countries extract or harvest to determine the rents for each commodity 
as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). Such measures are based on estimates and therefore are 
subject to measurement error. However, as long as the noise approximates classic errors in variables 
case, this is a source of attenuation bias. Therefore, it stacks the odds against our results implying 
that estimates of the effects of natural resource rents may be conservative.  
7 We use the merged version of the GRD dataset in order not to underestimate the fiscal capacity of 
countries with a federal system. 
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authorities to events in the natural resources sector and in the political system.8 ECt-
4 captures the quality of political institutions at t-4, the beginning of each episode. 
In line with our hypothesis, it is measured by the executive constraints score 
(xconst) provided by the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2014). RRit-4-bar* ECit-4 
is the interaction between natural resources and institutional quality.   
Xit is a set of time-varying controls (also averaged over t-4 to t-1, with a non-
overlapping structure). Some of them are standard variables from the literature on 
the origins of state capacity, including population density, external war and civil 
war. Population density should be positively correlated with state capacity, 
assuming that it is less challenging to develop taxation infrastructures in states 
where the population is concentrated in urban areas (Herbst, 2000). We use the 
number of people per square kilometres of land  as calculated by the World Bank 
(2016).  External conflicts increase the demand for public services such as defence 
and thereby increase the incentive to invest in state capacity. On the contrary, civil 
wars, promoting redistributive interests, hinder the construction of an efficient 
fiscal apparatus (Besley and Persson, 2010). To capture these effects, we use the 
hostility level of interstate disputes (Palmer et al., 2015) and the intensity level of 
internal and internationalised internal armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO, 2016), 
respectively. Finally, given the nature of our proxy for fiscal capacity, we also add 
controls that are macroeconomic in nature, as suggested in empirical studies on tax 
effort (e.g., Crivelli and Gupta 2014): the level of external debt, the sum of exports 
and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product, 
and the level of aid measured as official development assistance per capita. All the 
variables are fully described in Appendix A1.  
All regressions include country and year dummies (μi and λt, respectively). 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level to allow for unknown forms of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We study a sample of 100 developing 
                                                          
8 This approach appears to be standard in resource curse literature (and is in line with other literature, 
e.g., Caselli and Tesei, 2016, and Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010), as well as broader political 
economy literature investigating institutional factors (e.g., Clomp and de Haan, 2016). Presumably, 
empirical analyses using a panel with “high frequency” data (e.g., yearly) would fail to properly 
capture structural effects, such as resource abundance on fiscal capacity.  
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countries from 1981 to 2011. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show 
that our key variables vary both across countries and over time. Breaking the period 
down into decades shows that such a pattern of variation is not driven by any 
particular sub-period (Table 1, panel b). Table 1 in the Appendix describes variables 
and sources.  
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
 
3.4 Results 
This section presents the results, in four steps. We first consider the total amount of 
resource rents. Then, we decompose it to look at how different natural resources 
affect fiscal capacity. A series of robustness checks follows. Finally, we unpack the 
concept of fiscal capacity to identify which fiscal institutions are affected. 
 
 
3.4.1 The effect of natural resources on fiscal capacity 
  
Table 2 presents our baseline results. Columns 1-3, where the variable of 
interest enters in linear form, show a negative but not significant effect of total 
natural resource rents on fiscal capacity. However, this result could have been 
driven by the possibly non-linear relationship between resource rents and fiscal 
capacity. Indeed, the coefficient of total natural resource rents is significant once an 
interaction term is inserted between resource rents and our measure of institutional 
quality. Column 4 shows that on average fiscal capacity tends to be lower when 
countries experience an increase in resource rents. However, the interaction term 
appears significantly positive, suggesting that the negative effect of resource rents 
diminishes when the level of executive constraints increases. This result holds when 
the set of controls is included (Column 5). External debt, population density and 
civil war are significant and have the expected signs: fiscal capacity is higher for 
less sparsely populated states, whereas external debt and civil war decrease the 
investments in tax infrastructures.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Column 1 in table 4 shows the marginal effects of total natural resource rents 
at different levels of institutional quality. The results confirm our hypotheses: 
resource rents negatively affect fiscal capacity when the level of executive 
constraints is very low, but they can even be a blessing for countries where the 
executive is effectively limited by accountability groups. For countries, such as 
Uzbekistan, where constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored 
(xconst=1), a 1% increase in total natural resource rents would reduce the ability to 
raise direct taxes, our proxy for fiscal capacity, by approximately 0.41 percentage 
points. On the other hand, in countries with the highest level of executive 
constraints (e.g. Albania and Costa Rica), the same increase in resource rents would 
improve fiscal capacity by 0.37 percent. 9  Considering that the (within) standard 
deviation in resource rents is above three percentage points, such effects also appear 
to be economically significant.   
Next, we assess the effect of specific natural resources. Some studies suggest 
that the resource curse may by driven by specific types of natural resource 
endowments (Isham et al., 2005; Boschini et al., 2007), hence we consider 
individual components of total natural resource rents: forest, oil, gas, and mineral 
rents.10  Disaggregating the effects, Table 3 indicates that  none of the four types of 
resource rents is the sole force driving the heterogeneous effect on fiscal capacity. 
The general message remains that natural resources may be a curse or a blessing, 
                                                          
9 For the sake of thoroughness, we have also considered the partial effect of executive constraints at 
different levels of resource rents. For instance, natural resource rents in developing economies can 
stifle democratic governance and political institutions via rent-seeking activities by influential 
private actors or through patronage by the local elite. Hence, an alternative interpretation to our 
interaction term is that developing economies with less natural resource income may be less prone 
to such effects. To test this hypothesis, we estimated the magnitude and significance of the partial 
effect of executive constraints calculated at different levels of resource rents. Such estimates, 
available on request, show that the effect of executive constraints can decrease in magnitude and 
even change sign in environments with higher resource rents. However, there is no evidence that 
such effects are significant at conventional levels. 
10 The World Bank also provides data for coal rents, but they are ignored due to the lack of 
variation (very few observations are different from zero). 
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depending on the level of executive constraints. The political institutions-rents 
interaction term is positive and significant in all estimations except for mineral rents 
(where it is marginally significant). However, these results also suggest that 
different resource rents affect fiscal capacity differently. 
 
 [Tables 3 about here] 
 
In the last column of table 3, we include all resource rent variables in the 
regression. Table 4 shows the marginal effects calculated using the coefficients 
from this regression. Interestingly, the negative effect on fiscal capacity is mainly 
due to forest and mineral rents, but vanishes when the level of executive constraints 
is at least 4. This echoes earlier findings on minerals and health outcomes (Edwards 
2016), but crucially extends and qualifies them, suggesting that negative effects 
may not materialise, depending on the nature of political institutions; whereas oil 
and gas rents either have no effect or can actually foster investments in fiscal 
infrastructures if the level of executive constraints is high (xconst≥3). This partly 
contradicts initial empirical findings on the negative effects of point-source 
resources, while offering some support to those who cast doubt on the apparent 
curse of oil resources for growth and governance (Aleexev and Conrad 2009).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
3.4.2 Robustness checks  
The above findings are robust to controlling for all time-invariant variables and for 
a number of time-varying variables included in the regressions, as well as common 
trends. However, these results are based on the assumption that resource rents, 
measured on the basis of international commodity prices, are exogenous to a 
country’s institutions, whereas our results may be driven by large commodity 
producers, who can influence world commodity prices, raising endogeneity 
concerns with respect to our variable. Therefore all OPEC members and countries 
accounting for more than 3% of total world production of a certain commodity have 
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been excluded from the sample.11  In all our key regressions, the result on the 
heterogonous impact of natural resources proves to be robust (Table 5, columns 5-
8).   
Finally, we present further robustness checks based on the importance of 
natural resource rents for the economy.  We exclude countries in the top and bottom 
decile of resource rents. Excluding the bottom and top decile, the baseline results 
are confirmed.    
 
 
[Tables 5-9 about here] 
 
 
3.4.3 How do resource rents affect fiscal capacity?  
Our findings indicate that political institutions limiting executive power tend to 
alleviate (or even reverse) the negative effects that reliance on natural resources can 
have on fiscal systems. However, we have not identified the specific fiscal 
institutions affected, an exercise that could deliver insights into the specific 
channels of causation. However, we do consider two possible channels. Unpacking 
the concept of fiscal capacity, we distinguish between two aspects of fiscal 
institutions: the accountability and transparency of fiscal institutions, impartiality, 
and their effectiveness in extracting revenues. 
Impartiality concerns fairness in the exercise of taxation powers: it is the 
ability of tax systems to make the state accountable to, and transparent for, its 
citizens, building state-society relations leading to quasi-compliance (e.g., Levi 
1988). The other concerns their effectiveness in raising tax revenues, i.e., the ability 
to coerce citizens to pay taxes. Outcome-based measures of fiscal capacity, such as 
the tax to GDP ratio or the measure used so far, cannot differentiate between these 
two quite different dimensions of fiscal systems related to the exercise of taxation 
powers.   
To test whether a fiscal resource curse works through impartiality or 
effectiveness (or both), we use a recently created set of indicators provided by PEFA 
                                                          
11 We identify big producers following the example of Caselli and Tesei (2016). 
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(2006), the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability project developed by 
a partnership of national and international organizations (e.g., IMF and the World 
Bank).12 In particular, we use six indicators selected from the PEFA database, 
neatly capturing the impartiality and effectiveness of tax systems. They are 
described below:13 
1. Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities, which evaluates 
taxpayers’ access to information on tax liabilities and administrative 
procedures; 
2. Tax appeals: assessing the functioning of a tax appeals mechanism; 
3. Controls in the taxpayer registration system, assessing the quality and 
maintenance of a taxpayer database; 
4. Effectiveness of penalties for non-compliance: this addresses failures in 
registration and tax declaration obligations assessing whether penalties for 
all areas of non-compliance are set sufficiently high to act as deterrence and 
are consistently administered; 
5. Quality of tax audit evaluates whether and how tax audits and fraud 
investigations are undertaken;   
6. Effectiveness of transfer of tax collections to the Treasury by the revenue 
administration assesses how often revenue collections are transferred to the 
Treasury. 
The first two indicators capture the impartiality of fiscal capacity, since they 
hinge on the relationship between the State and the public: empowering it against 
the taxation power of the former or making such power clearly defined and not 
subject to discretion.  The final four measures assess the coercive aspects of the tax 
system: they are all desirable features of a tax machine aiming at raising revenues.14 
                                                          
12 See www.pefa.org for a presentation of the project, its aims and the data. 
13 Appendix 1 sets out detailed definitions and scales of assessment for our six PEFA indicators. 
Full details of the PEFA framework, indicators and assessment method are given in the database 
codebook at http://www.pefa.org/sites/pefa.org/files/attachments/PMFEng-finalSZreprint04-
12_1.pdf. 
14 Methodologically, these are de facto measures: what matters is the actual working of the system 
and not what is merely written in the law. This ensures that the assessment is based on institutional 
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Higher scores indicate greater levels of fiscal capacity: both impartiality and 
effectiveness. The table below presents OLS cross-section regressions for over sixty 
developing economies, where each of the above fiscal institution measures acts as 
a dependent variable.15  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Subject to the limitations of cross-section estimates discussed earlier, the 
above results suggest that the effect of natural resources is likely to work through 
fiscal institutions relating to impartiality, while the evidence that they affect 
effectiveness is weak. The related marginal effects, in particular, indicate that a 
fiscal resource curse exists only in political systems with low levels of checks and 
balances on executive power. The curse disappears, or becomes a blessing, in 
economies that can successfully limit the power of the executive. Under such 
political conditions, the fiscal bargain between a ruler and citizens, at the heart of 
the construction of a fiscal state (Brautigam et al 2008), may be facilitated. 
Therefore, it seems that developing both fiscal capacity and the natural resources 
sector, is possible, without any tradeoff.  
 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
reforms, reacting to the pressure of external authorities, to some degree internalised by those who 
implement them.    
15 Although the PEFA dataset is gradually expanding, its structure is such that it does not yet allow 
for panel analysis. In particular, PEFA variables range only from 2005 to 2013 and have a T-bar of 
1.5, as well as exhibiting very little variation within countries.  
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3.5 Conclusions  
This paper investigates how natural resources affect the incentives for investing in 
fiscal capacity, and the role of political institutions in this process. Based on 
previous studies demonstrating that institutions can mitigate or even reverse the 
resource curse, we posit that the negative effect of resource rents on the ability of 
states to raise revenues can vanish if political institutions effectively limit executive 
power. Using panel data covering the period 1981-2011 for 100 developing 
countries, we find that resource rents are negatively associated with fiscal capacity, 
measured as the share of non-resource taxes on income, profits, and capital gains in 
non-resource total taxes. However, countries with a high level of executive 
constraints are able to neutralise or even reverse this effect, depending on the type 
of resource endowments. Further analysis shows that the effect of natural resources 
is likely to work through fiscal institutions that make the state accountable and 
transparent to its citizens. Our findings indicate that, in polities providing strong 
checks and balances on the executive power, it is possible to develop both fiscal 
capacity and the natural resources sector. Whether a fiscal resource curse exists or 
not is a question of what type of political institutions countries have adopted.   
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Table 3.1 – Summary Statistics 
 
Panel (a) Observations Mean 
Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
overall between within   
Fiscal capacity 350 29.858 11.827 10.286 5.947 7.052 68.692 
Executive constraints 350 4.446 2.003 1.711 1.200 1 7 
Total natural resources rents 350 8.497 10.954 12.878 3.212 0.003 70.624 
Forest rents 350 3.449 5.685 5.893 2.196 0 41.770 
Oil rents 350 3.028 8.242 10.372 1.597 0 50.107 
Gas rents 350 0.895 4.105 5.192 1.275 0 55.528 
Mineral rents 350 1.045 2.863 2.718 1.432 0 20.618 
Political stability 350 3.093 1.187 1.007 0.485 2 7 
External Debt 350 71.510 87.168 78.008 53.229 2.725 759.970 
Trade 350 75.696 38.127 35.851 14.345 13.037 253.047 
Net ODA and aid per capita 350 71.208 84.082 76.157 34.113 -3.785 620.926 
Population density 350 98.265 142.726 139.294 18.085 1.462 1145.363 
External war 350 0.955 1.326 1.252 0.704 0 5 
Civil war 350 0.238 0.492 0.335 0.340 0 2 
Panel (b) 
1981 - 1990 1991 - 2000 2001 - 2011 
Std. Dev Std. Dev Std. Dev 
overall between within overall between within overall between within 
Fiscal capacity 12.348 11.502 3.654 12.106 11.342 4.415 11.642 10.982 4.077 
Executive constraints 2.050 1.960 0.762 1.992 1.776 1.017 1.829 1.736 0.672 
Total natural resources rents 12.983 11.753 3.487 7.742 9.040 1.758 12.920 14.113 3.172 
Forest rents 8.665 7.330 2.480 5.251 4.837 1.170 5.287 6.003 1.201 
Oil rents 11.167 9.922 2.398 5.631 7.999 1.078 8.418 10.644 1.161 
Gas rents 0.648 0.731 0.095 1.212 1.351 0.278 6.553 6.266 1.583 
Mineral rents 2.962 4.608 0.358 2.625 2.306 0.788 2.982 2.663 1.483 
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Table 3.2 - Baseline results for fiscal capacity and total natural resources rents 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Fiscal 
capacity 
Fiscal 
capacity 
Fiscal 
capacity 
Fiscal 
capacity 
Fiscal 
capacity 
      
Total natural resources rents -0.127 -0.122 -0.0759 -0.591*** -0.544** 
 (0.157) (0.158) (0.194) (0.223) (0.254) 
Executive constraints  0.238 0.360 -0.612 -0.522 
  (0.354) (0.458) (0.432) (0.493) 
Total natural resources 
rents*Executive constraints 
   0.126*** 0.131*** 
    (0.0315) (0.0368) 
Political Stability   0.651  0.461 
   (0.950)  (0.870) 
External Debt   -0.0188**  -0.0165*** 
   (0.00747)  (0.00578) 
Trade   0.0211  0.00306 
   (0.0302)  (0.0296) 
Net ODA and aid per capita   -0.00353  -0.0114 
   (0.0139)  (0.0138) 
Population density   0.0521*  0.0588** 
   (0.0269)  (0.0265) 
External war   0.502  0.482 
   (0.720)  (0.679) 
Civil war   -2.638**  -2.947** 
   (1.317)  (1.303) 
Constant 31.50*** 30.65*** 22.99*** 35.43*** 29.91*** 
 (2.480) (2.620) (5.530) (3.219) (5.794) 
      
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 
Number of country_id 91 91 91 91 91 
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.093 0.148 0.144 0.200 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Joint(p)    0.000615 0.00217 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 - Fiscal capacity and different natural resources rents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Forest Rents Forest Rents Oil Rents Oil Rents Gas Rents Gas Rents Mineral Rents Mineral Rents Rents 
          
Executive constraints 0.389 -0.229 0.295 0.0407 0.301 0.254 0.290 0.226 -0.602 
 (0.447) (0.501) (0.447) (0.475) (0.444) (0.440) (0.441) (0.421) (0.509) 
Forest rents -0.347 -0.918***       -1.108*** 
 (0.243) (0.179)       (0.177) 
Forest rents*Executive 
constraints 
 0.163***       0.169*** 
  (0.0519)       (0.0548) 
Oil rents   0.165 -0.123     -0.289 
   (0.324) (0.359)     (0.364) 
Oil rents*Executive 
constraints 
   0.122***     0.122*** 
    (0.0429)     (0.0386) 
Gas rents     0.172 -0.238   0.410 
     (0.281) (0.183)   (0.464) 
Gas rents*Executive 
constraints 
     0.175**   0.0354 
      (0.0739)   (0.0864) 
Mineral rents       -0.407** -0.881 -1.244** 
       (0.192) (0.544) (0.588) 
Mineral rents*Executive 
constraints 
       0.117 0.180 
        (0.124) (0.126) 
Political Stability 0.639 0.477 0.134 -0.0799 0.233 0.180 0.235 0.304 0.273 
 (0.877) (0.853) (1.009) (0.977) (0.879) (0.859) (0.882) (0.907) (0.916) 
External Debt -0.0148** -0.0124** -0.0210*** -0.0209*** -0.0206*** -0.0204*** -0.0224*** -0.0229*** -0.0133*** 
 (0.00721) (0.00554) (0.00681) (0.00653) (0.00656) (0.00631) (0.00756) (0.00799) (0.00487) 
Trade 0.0248 0.00273 0.0197 0.0225 0.0212 0.0172 0.0239 0.0204 -7.97e-05 
 (0.0293) (0.0316) (0.0283) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0271) (0.0284) (0.0316) 
Net ODA and aid per 
capita 
0.000591 -0.0124 -0.00453 -0.00288 -0.00487 -0.00331 -0.00746 -0.00753 -0.0113 
 (0.0147) (0.0156) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0146) 
Population density 0.0516** 0.0530** 0.0590** 0.0622** 0.0587** 0.0616** 0.0558** 0.0563** 0.0569** 
 (0.0255) (0.0249) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0250) 
External war 0.523 0.424 0.464 0.495 0.435 0.408 0.399 0.426 0.299 
 (0.723) (0.714) (0.729) (0.704) (0.729) (0.729) (0.705) (0.710) (0.674) 
Civil war -2.794** -2.816** -2.680* -2.806** -2.727** -2.729** -2.566* -2.657* -3.070** 
 (1.311) (1.280) (1.363) (1.365) (1.360) (1.364) (1.316) (1.351) (1.304) 
Constant 22.54*** 28.28*** 23.55*** 25.35*** 23.65*** 23.92*** 24.89*** 25.12*** 32.24*** 
 (5.781) (5.905) (5.636) (5.849) (5.584) (5.497) (5.553) (5.528) (5.862) 
          
Observations 350 350 355 355 355 355 355 355 350 
Number of country_id 91 91 92 92 92 92 92 92 91 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.193 0.148 0.166 0.149 0.162 0.154 0.155 0.238 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Joint(p)  8.69e-06  0.0200  0.0647  0.0686 8.55e-09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4 – Marginal effects of resource rents at different levels of executive constraints 
 
 
 Total natural resources rents 
Forest rents 
 Oil rents Gas rents Mineral rents 
executive 
constraints  b/se         b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          
1 -0.413*          -0.939***        -0.166           0.446           -1.064** (0.23)           (0.14)           (0.36)           (0.39)           (0.47)    
2 -0.282           -0.771***        -0.044           0.481           -0.884** (0.21)           (0.12)           (0.37)           (0.33)           (0.37)    
3 -0.151           -0.602***        0.079            0.516*          -0.705** (0.19)           (0.12)           (0.37)           (0.28)           (0.28)    
4 -0.020           -0.434***        0.201            0.552**         -0.525** (0.18)           (0.14)           (0.38)           (0.24)           (0.23)    
5 0.111           -0.265           0.323            0.587**         -0.345    (0.17)           (0.18)           (0.40)           (0.24)           (0.24)    
6 0.242           -0.097           0.446            0.623**         -0.165    (0.18)           (0.23)           (0.41)           (0.27)           (0.31)    
7 0.373**          0.072            0.568 0.658**          0.015    (0.19)           (0.28)           (0.43)           (0.32)           (0.40)    
 
Notes: The marginal effects of specific natural resources are calculated using the coefficients from 
Table 3, Column 9.  
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Table 3.5 - Fiscal capacity and different natural resources rents – Robustness checks  
  Excluding bottom decile Excluding top decile Excluding big producers Excluding OPEC countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Total Rents Rents Total Rents Rents Total Rents Rents Total Rents Rents 
         
Executive constraints -0.219 -0.270 -0.617 -0.443 -0.844* -0.872* -0.443 -0.371 
 (0.548) (0.591) (0.504) (0.619) (0.501) (0.477) (0.516) (0.569) 
Total natural resources rents -0.482*  -1.033***  -0.832***  -0.943***  
 (0.252)  (0.346)  (0.199)  (0.220)  
Total natural resources rents*Executive 
constraints 
0.101***  0.173***  0.173***  0.171***  
 (0.0384)  (0.0614)  (0.0408)  (0.0487)  
Forest rents  -0.992***  -1.529***  -1.187***  -1.127*** 
  (0.179)  (0.402)  (0.167)  (0.186) 
Forest rents*Executive constraints  0.124**  0.216***  0.216***  0.173*** 
  (0.0608)  (0.0771)  (0.0557)  (0.0598) 
Oil rents  -0.237  -0.248  -0.429  -0.759 
  (0.366)  (0.502)  (0.427)  (0.610) 
Oil rents*Executive constraints  0.101**  0.00158  0.104*  0.101 
  (0.0425)  (0.101)  (0.0551)  (0.173) 
Gas rents  0.337  -0.186  -0.646  0.0328 
  (0.377)  (1.323)  (0.451)  (0.365) 
Gas rents*Executive constraints  0.0318  0.142  0.563**  0.102 
  (0.0707)  (0.191)  (0.267)  (0.0697) 
Mineral rents  -1.152*  -1.314*  -1.200**  -1.418** 
  (0.605)  (0.702)  (0.555)  (0.580) 
Mineral rents*Executive constraints  0.142  0.183  0.216  0.208 
  (0.130)  (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.126) 
Political Stability 0.613 0.413 0.227 0.680 -0.282 -0.0825 0.782 0.798 
 (0.948) (0.995) (0.939) (1.012) (0.861) (0.819) (0.934) (0.974) 
External Debt -0.0163*** -0.0133** -0.0181** -0.0149** -0.0141*** -0.0110** -0.0123** -0.0113** 
 (0.00595) (0.00515) (0.00694) (0.00691) (0.00504) (0.00481) (0.00507) (0.00481) 
Trade 0.0262 0.0248 0.0195 0.0203 0.00921 -0.00408 0.00757 0.00758 
 (0.0305) (0.0321) (0.0371) (0.0368) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0323) (0.0326) 
Net ODA and aid per capita -0.0118 -0.00957 -0.0178 -0.0114 -0.0199 -0.0209 -0.0159 -0.0152 
 (0.0150) (0.0169) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0165) (0.0139) (0.0158) 
Population density 0.0498* 0.0470* 0.0793*** 0.0722** 0.0737*** 0.0667** 0.0721** 0.0673** 
 (0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0299) (0.0295) (0.0276) (0.0266) (0.0284) (0.0280) 
External war 1.044* 0.855 0.301 0.103 0.382 0.234 0.267 0.159 
 (0.541) (0.534) (0.702) (0.725) (0.733) (0.759) (0.716) (0.722) 
Civil war -2.229* -2.382** -2.927** -2.675* -2.108 -1.999 -3.038** -2.975** 
 (1.130) (1.161) (1.360) (1.367) (1.326) (1.324) (1.346) (1.356) 
Constant 25.11*** 27.32*** 30.33*** 28.59*** 33.63*** 34.31*** 29.53*** 30.29*** 
 (5.696) (5.717) (6.266) (6.954) (5.864) (5.533) (6.412) (6.862) 
         
Observations 313 313 315 315 296 296 326 326 
Number of country_id 84 84 79 79 78 78 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.232 0.270 0.203 0.218 0.222 0.249 0.217 0.227 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Joint(p) 0.0354 1.38e-08 0.0140 0.000383 5.81e-05 2.22e-10 0.000255 6.07e-07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 – Marginal effects of resource rents at different levels of executive constraints - 
Excluding bottom decile 
 
 
 Total natural resources rents 
Forest rents 
 Oil rents Gas rents Mineral rents 
executive 
constraints  b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          
1 -0.381*          -0.868***        -0.136           0.369           -1.010** (0.23)           (0.14)           (0.36)           (0.32)           (0.49)    
2 -0.280           -0.744***        -0.034           0.401           -0.869** (0.20)           (0.11)           (0.37)           (0.27)           (0.38)    
3 -0.179           -0.620***        0.067            0.433*          -0.727** (0.18)           (0.12)           (0.38)           (0.23)           (0.29)    
4 -0.077           -0.496***        0.168            0.464**         -0.585** (0.17)           (0.15)           (0.39)           (0.21)           (0.23)    
5 0.024           -0.371*          0.269            0.496**         -0.444*   (0.17)           (0.20)           (0.40)           (0.21)           (0.25)    
6 0.125           -0.247           0.371            0.528**         -0.302    (0.18)           (0.25)           (0.42)           (0.24)           (0.32)    
7 0.226           -0.123           0.472            0.560**         -0.161    (0.19)           (0.30)           (0.45)           (0.28)           (0.42)    
Notes: The marginal effects of specific natural resources are calculated using the coefficients from Table 5, Columns 1 and 
2 
 
  
 
  
138 
 
Table 3.7 – Marginal effects of resource rents at different levels of executive constraints - 
Excluding top decile 
 
 
 Total natural resources rents 
Forest rents 
 Oil rents Gas rents Mineral rents 
executive 
constraints  b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          
1 -0.860***        -1.313***        -0.247           -0.044           -1.131** (0.29)           (0.34)           (0.45)           (1.14)           (0.57)    
2 -0.687***        -1.097***        -0.245           0.098           -0.948** (0.24)           (0.30)           (0.42)           (0.95)           (0.45)    
3 -0.515***        -0.882***        -0.243           0.240           -0.766** (0.20)           (0.26)           (0.41)           (0.77)           (0.34)    
4 -0.342**         -0.666***        -0.242           0.381           -0.583** (0.17)           (0.25)           (0.43)           (0.59)           (0.27)    
5 -0.169           -0.450*          -0.240           0.523           -0.400    (0.15)           (0.26)           (0.46)           (0.43)           (0.27)    
6 0.004           -0.234           -0.239           0.665**         -0.217    (0.16)           (0.29)           (0.52)           (0.30)           (0.33)    
7 0.176           -0.019           -0.237           0.807***        -0.035    (0.20)           (0.33)           (0.58)           (0.27)           (0.44)    
Notes: The marginal effects of specific natural resources are calculated using the coefficients from Table 5, Columns 3 and 
4 
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Table 3.8 – Marginal effects of resource rents at different levels of executive constraints - 
Excluding big producers 
 
 
 Total natural resources rents Forest rents Oil rents Gas rents Mineral rents 
executive 
constraints  b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          
1 -0.659***        -0.971***        -0.325           -0.083           -0.985** (0.18)           (0.13)           (0.40)           (0.33)           (0.43)    
2 -0.487***        -0.755***        -0.221           0.480           -0.769** (0.16)           (0.10)           (0.38)           (0.39)           (0.33)    
3 -0.314*          -0.539***        -0.116           1.043*          -0.553** (0.16)           (0.10)           (0.37)           (0.58)           (0.26)    
4 -0.141           -0.323**         -0.012           1.606**         -0.338    (0.17)           (0.13)           (0.37)           (0.82)           (0.26)    
5 0.031           -0.107           0.092            2.169**         -0.122    (0.18)           (0.17)           (0.37)           (1.07)           (0.34)    
6 0.204            0.109            0.196            2.732**          0.094    (0.20)           (0.22)           (0.38)           (1.33)           (0.44)    
7 0.377            0.325            0.300            3.295**          0.310    (0.23)           (0.27)           (0.40)           (1.59)           (0.57)    
Notes: The marginal effects of specific natural resources are calculated using the coefficients from Table 5, Columns 5 and 
6  
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Table 3.9 – Marginal effects of resource rents at different levels of executive constraints - 
Excluding OPEC countries 
 
 
 Total natural resources rents Forest rents Oil rents Gas rents Mineral rents 
executive 
constraints  b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          
1 -0.772***        -0.954***        -0.658           0.135           -1.209*** (0.18)           (0.14)           (0.47)           (0.32)           (0.46)    
2 -0.601***        -0.781***        -0.556           0.237           -1.001*** (0.15)           (0.12)           (0.36)           (0.28)           (0.36)    
3 -0.430***        -0.607***        -0.455           0.339           -0.793*** (0.13)           (0.12)           (0.31)           (0.25)           (0.26)    
4 -0.259**         -0.434***        -0.353           0.442*          -0.584*** (0.12)           (0.14)           (0.36)           (0.24)           (0.21)    
5 -0.088           -0.261           -0.252           0.544**         -0.376*   (0.13)           (0.19)           (0.46)           (0.26)           (0.23)    
6 0.083           -0.088           -0.151           0.646**         -0.168    (0.16)           (0.24)           (0.60)           (0.28)           (0.30)    
7 0.254            0.086           -0.049           0.748**          0.041    (0.20)           (0.29)           (0.75)           (0.33)           (0.40)    
Notes: The marginal effects of specific natural resources are calculated using the coefficients from Table 5, Column 11  
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Table 3.10 - Tests of possible channels of causation from resource rents to fiscal capacity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLE
S 
Transparenc
y of taxpayer 
obligations 
and liabilities 
Transparenc
y of taxpayer 
obligations 
and liabilities 
Tax appeals Tax appeals Controls in 
the taxpayer 
registration 
system 
Controls in 
the taxpayer 
registration 
system 
Effectiveness 
of penalties 
for non-
compliance 
with 
registration 
and tax 
declaration 
Effectiveness 
of penalties 
for non-
compliance 
with 
registration 
and tax 
declaration 
Quality of 
tax audit 
Quality of 
tax audit 
Effectiveness 
of transfer of 
tax collections 
to the Treasury 
by the revenue 
administration. 
Effectiveness 
of transfer of 
tax collections 
to the Treasury 
by the revenue 
administration. 
             
Total natural 
resources 
rents 
-0.00945 -0.0409** -0.00498 -0.0229 -0.00881 -0.00135 -0.0116 -0.0437* -0.000753 0.00435 -0.000799 -0.0176 
 (0.00982) (0.0162) (0.0103) (0.0212) (0.00836) (0.0193) (0.0160) (0.0225) (0.0116) (0.0170) (0.0133) (0.0313) 
Executive 
constraints 
0.148 0.0659 0.244*** 0.197** 0.295*** 0.315*** 0.238** 0.154 0.108 0.121 0.0779 0.0342 
 (0.0898) (0.0997) (0.0822) (0.0879) (0.0653) (0.0778) (0.0925) (0.0998) (0.0827) (0.0945) (0.0759) (0.0902) 
Total natural 
resources 
rents*Execut
ive 
constraints 
 0.0118**  0.00670  -0.00280  0.0121*  -0.00192  0.00630 
  (0.00449)  (0.00643)  (0.00574)  (0.00629)  (0.00388)  (0.00756) 
polstab8104 0.0367 0.000691 0.108 0.0875 -0.0605 -0.0520 0.0680 0.0308 -0.325** -0.319** -0.0426 -0.0619 
 (0.144) (0.145) (0.111) (0.112) (0.133) (0.134) (0.153) (0.161) (0.128) (0.132) (0.140) (0.144) 
Net ODA 
and aid per 
capita 
0.000181 0.000630 -0.00250*** -0.00224** 0.000219 0.000113 -6.41e-05 0.000393 0.000312 0.000239 -0.000766 -0.000526 
 (0.00155) (0.00150) (0.000931) (0.000915) (0.00155) (0.00160) (0.00171) (0.00167) (0.00208) (0.00213) (0.00159) (0.00154) 
Population 
density 
0.000531 0.000557 0.000152 0.000167 -0.000229 -0.000235 -0.000169 -0.000138 0.000445 0.000440 5.69e-05 7.11e-05 
 (0.000754) (0.000716) (0.000720) (0.000667) (0.000450) (0.000459) (0.000604) (0.000552) (0.000596) (0.000592) (0.000759) (0.000780) 
External war 0.283** 0.297** 0.177 0.185 0.0928 0.0894 0.178 0.193* 0.171 0.169 0.200** 0.208** 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.123) (0.125) (0.138) (0.140) (0.112) (0.112) (0.127) (0.129) (0.0986) (0.0991) 
Civil war -0.0363 -0.0326 0.0328 0.0349 0.126 0.125 -0.182 -0.179 0.175 0.174 -0.220 -0.218 
 (0.237) (0.230) (0.212) (0.217) (0.259) (0.264) (0.203) (0.203) (0.193) (0.196) (0.221) (0.218) 
statehist50v3 0.00439 0.00522 0.00440 0.00488 0.000380 0.000182 0.00626 0.00715 0.00563 0.00549 0.00458 0.00502 
 (0.00517) (0.00519) (0.00412) (0.00407) (0.00269) (0.00278) (0.00550) (0.00527) (0.00370) (0.00378) (0.00345) (0.00363) 
Constant 0.589 0.923 -0.266 -0.0762 0.622 0.542 0.350 0.690 1.501* 1.447 2.266*** 2.445*** 
 (0.834) (0.864) (0.745) (0.769) (0.805) (0.826) (0.936) (1.001) (0.881) (0.912) (0.777) (0.810) 
             
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 62 62 62 62 61 61 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.206 0.236 0.234 0.238 0.278 0.266 0.110 0.136 0.344 0.332 0.025 0.023 
Joint(p)  0.0380  0.553  0.434  0.127  0.874  0.420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.11 – Effects of resource intensity on fiscal capacity at different levels of executive 
constraints 
 
 
Transparency of 
taxpayer 
obligations and 
liabilities 
Tax appeals 
mechanisms 
Controls in the 
taxpayer 
registration 
system 
Effectiveness of 
penalties for 
non-compliance 
with registration 
and tax 
declaration 
Quality of tax 
audit 
Effectiveness of 
transfer of tax 
collections to the 
Treasury by the 
revenue 
administration. 
executive 
constraints  b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          b/se          
1 -0.029**        -0.016          -0.004          -0.032*          0.002           -0.011    (0.01)           (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.02)    
2 -0.017*         -0.009          -0.007          -0.020           0.001           -0.005    (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)          (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.02)    
3 -0.006          -0.003          -0.010          -0.007          -0.001          0.001    (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)          (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.01)    
4 0.006           0.004           -0.013           0.005           -0.003          0.008    (0.01)           (0.01)           (0.01)          (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.01)    
5 0.018*          0.011           -0.015           0.017           -0.005          0.014    (0.01)           (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.02)           (0.01)          (0.01)    
6 0.030**         0.017           -0.018           0.029           -0.007          0.020    (0.01)           (0.02)           (0.02)          (0.03)           (0.02)          (0.02)    
7 0.042**         0.024           -0.021           0.041           -0.009          0.027    (0.02)           (0.03)           (0.02)          (0.03)           (0.02)          (0.02)    
Notes: The marginal effects of total natural resources rents are calculated using the coefficients from Table 10, Columns 
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 
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Figure 3.1 - Relationship between non resource-tax and natural resources rents 
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Appendix       
Table 3.A.1 – Variables and sources 
 
 
Variable   Description Source 
Non-Resource tax 
excluding social 
contributions 
Non-resource component of total tax Revenue 
excluding social contributions and natural resource 
revenue 
International Centre for Tax and 
Development 
Fiscal capacity 
Non-resource component of taxes on income, 
profits, and capital gains as a percentage of non-
resource component of total tax revenue excluding 
social contributions and natural resource revenue 
Own elaboration based on data from the 
International Centre for Tax and 
Development 
Executive constraints 
Institutionalised constraints on the decision making 
power of chief executives ranging from 1 (unlimited 
authority) to 7 (limited authority). Values outside 
[1;7] are treated as missing.  
Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic 
Peace (Marshall et al. 2014) 
Total natural 
resources rents 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP). Data are 
averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Forest rents Forest rents (% of GDP). Data are averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Oil rents Oil rents (% of GDP). Data are averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Gas rents Gas rents (% of GDP). Data are averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Mineral rents Mineral rents (% of GDP). Data are averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Political stability 
Sum of xropen (openness of executive recruitment) 
and xrcomp (competitiveness of executive 
recruitment) variables in the Polity IV dataset 
ranging from 2 (instable) to 7 (stable) 
Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic 
Peace (Marshall et al. 2014) 
External Debt External debt stocks (% of GNI). Data are averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Trade 
Trade (% of GDP). Data are averaged over the 
period t-4 to t-1 
 
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
Net ODA and aid per 
capita 
Net official development assistance and official aid 
received (constant 2013 US$) per capita. Data are 
averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
 
Own elaboration based on data from World 
Bank – World development Indicators 
Population density 
Population density (people per sq. km of land area). 
Data are averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
  
World Bank – World development 
Indicators 
External war 
Hostility level of interstate dispute ranging from 0 
(no dispute) to 5 (war). Data are averaged over the 
period t-4 to t-1 
Palmer et al. (2015) 
Civil war 
Intensity level of Internal and internationalised 
internal armed conflict ranging from 0 (no conflict) 
to 2 (more than 1000 battle-related deaths). Data are 
averaged over the period t-4 to t-1 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
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Figure 3.A.1 - Relationship between non resource-tax and natural resources rents 
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Figure 3.A.2 – Marginal effects of total natural resources rents at different levels of executive 
constraints 
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Figure 3.A.3 – Marginal effects of forest rents at different levels of executive constraints 
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Figure 3.A.4 – Marginal effects of oil rents at different levels of executive constraints 
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Figure 3.A.5 – Marginal effects of gas rents at different levels of executive constraints 
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Figure 3.A.6 – Marginal effects of mineral rents at different levels of executive constraints 
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Conclusions 
This thesis comprises three essays that investigate institutions, how they may 
be affected by internal and external factors, and their role in economic 
development. The first essay analyses the impact of civil society organizations 
and democracy assistance on political institutions. Using the UNDEF project 
database, which provides the conditions for treatment effect evaluations and 
allows a cross-country analysis to be carried out, the paper shows that the 
intervention of local civil society organizations supported by an international 
organization such as the United Nations may lead to increased democracy level 
in recipient countries but only if repeated over time. The essay confirms that 
projects with specific aims may be more effective in democratisation than large 
amounts of general economic aid, even over a short period of time (Scott and 
Steele, 2011), and are consistent with Persson and Tabellini (2009) who claim 
that democracy emerges through the accumulation of a stock of civic and social 
assets. It suggests that the beneficial effect of UNDEF projects could be 
explained by the ex-post evaluation that indirectly affects both the CSO 
involved in the project, and the institutions benefiting from its activity, or by 
the repeated interaction between UNDEF governance and recipient countries. 
However, further analysis should be carried out to understand the mechanisms 
through which aid and local civil society organizations affect political 
institutions.  
The second and the third essays contribute to the literature on the resource 
curse, the counter-intuitive finding that countries highly endowed in exploitable 
natural resources perform worse than those in which this asset is lacking. To 
take into account the heterogeneous effect of natural resources across countries, 
the second essay carries out a case-study analysis and evaluates the effect of the 
variation in oil endowment on political regimes. Using the synthetic control 
method, it confirms the idea that natural resources may be a curse or a blessing 
for a country, depending on the quality of its institutions (Mehlum et al. 2006; 
Robinson et al. 2006). In particular, this essay shows that the relationship 
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between natural resources and democracy depends on the initial level of 
democracy itself. Indeed, only countries with a high level of democracy before 
the peak of oil discoveries are unaffected by it. A plausible explanation for these 
results is that, as the rate of discoveries starts to decline, incumbents enforce 
higher entry barriers to grab the residual resources. However, this is prevented 
by a high level of executive constraints.  
Relying on the same hypothesis according to which institutions can 
mitigate or actually reverse the resource curse, the third essay investigates how 
natural resources affect the incentives for investing in fiscal capacity, and the 
role of political institutions in this process. The share of non-resource taxes on 
income, profits, and capital gains in total non-resource taxes is used as a proxy 
for fiscal capacity. This measure allows the ability to raise taxes to be 
distinguished from a government’s policy choices, given that collecting income 
taxes compared to other types of taxes requires major investments in fiscal 
infrastructure (Besley and Persson, 2011). The panel analysis shows that 
resource rents are negatively associated with fiscal capacity, but countries with 
a high level of executive constraints are able to neutralise or reverse this effect, 
depending on the type of resource endowments. The essay seeks to identify the 
specific fiscal institutions affected by natural resources using a recently created 
set of indicators from the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
project. The findings indicate that the effect of natural resources is likely to 
work through fiscal institutions that make the state accountable to, and 
transparent for, its citizens. 
Overall, this thesis confirms that “institutions rule” (Rodrik et al., 2004). 
Indeed, institutional quality is essential to at least counterbalance the impact of 
exogenous factors such as natural resources on development outcomes. 
Moreover, it provides some reason for optimism about the possibility of taking 
action to improve these institutions. 
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